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INTRODUCTION 
The restrictions on migration that have been imposed by individ-
ual countries—and, in recent years, particularly those imposed by 
wealthy nations—have contributed significantly to the contemporary 
problem of international trafficking.1  Rising restrictions on migration 
† Professor of Law, U.C. Irvine School of Law; J.D., Yale Law School, 1998; A.B., 
Stanford University, 1994.  The author wishes to thank Professor Tobias Wolff for his 
invitation to participate in this Symposium and Sarah Paoletti, J.J. Rosenbaum, and 
Jayashri Srikantiah for their helpful comments during and after our panel discussion.  
Thanks also to Dean Erwin Chemerinsky for his support of this research and to Ellen 
Augustiniak and Christina Tsou for their research assistance.  Finally, thanks to Max 
and Jonathan for being such great sports and such fun travelling companions. 
1 See generally DOUGLAS S. MASSEY ET AL., WORLDS IN MOTION:  UNDERSTANDING 
INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AT THE END OF THE MILLENNIUM 293 (1998) (noting that 
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over the past two decades have coincided with unprecedented free-
dom of movement for goods and capital.  The physical movement of 
people and goods from one nation to another has never been easier.  
But while free trade agreements and technology have facilitated the 
flow of goods and money across borders, immigration restrictions 
have resulted in more rigid restrictions on the cross-border movement 
of people.  Unsurprisingly, unauthorized migration ensues.2  This in-
cludes both economically motivated migrations and migrations under-
taken by individuals fleeing oppression and conflict in their home 
countries.  Facing waves of refugees and job seekers with new modes 
of transportation, the West has moved to raise legal barriers to entry 
for desperate and vulnerable populations.3 
These legal barriers are backed up by physical barriers to entry.  
In the United States, for example, the build up of border enforce-
the restrictions imposed by developed countries have deleterious effects on “individual 
rights, civil liberties, and human dignity”); Karen E. Bravo, Exploring the Analogy Between 
Modern Trafficking in Humans and the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade, 25 B.U. INT’L L.J. 207, 
295 (2007) [hereinafter Bravo, Exploring] (analogizing the trade-offs between individu-
al states’ border-protection measures and human trafficking harms to trade-offs made 
in furtherance of the institution of slavery); Karen E. Bravo, Free Labor!  A Labor Liberali-
zation Solution to Modern Trafficking in Humans, 18 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
545, 547 (2009) [hereinafter Bravo, Free Labor!] (explaining that people are “more 
vulnerable to the predations of exploitative middlemen such as traffickers in human 
beings” because “borders are now more heavily policed and enforced”); James C. Ha-
thaway, The Human Rights Quagmire of “Human Trafficking,” 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 5 (2008) 
(“Indeed, the criminalization of smuggling may actaully increase the risk of human 
trafficking by driving up the cost of facilitated transboarder movement and leaving the 
poor with no choice but to mortgage their futures in order to pay for safe passage.”); 
Anne T. Gallagher, Human Rights and Human Trafficking:  Quagmire or Firm Ground?  A 
Response to James Hathaway, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 789, 833-34 (2009) (observing that migra-
tion regimes reinforce discrimination and inequality and positing that truly open bor-
ders could alleviate these problems). 
2 Cf. Gallagher, supra note 1, at 833-34 (arguing that trafficking will decrease if the 
international labor-market mobility mirrors that of goods and services). 
3 See, e.g., BRIDGET ANDERSON, DOING THE DIRTY WORK?  THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF 
DOMESTIC LABOUR 138 (2000) (cataloging the power structure under which migrant 
domestic workers operate); Itty Abraham & Willem van Schendel, Introduction:  The 
Making of Illicitness (describing how these barriers reflect intrastate contradictions 
about what is illicit), in ILLICIT FLOWS AND CRIMINAL THINGS:  STATES, BORDERS, AND 
THE OTHER SIDE OF GLOBALIZATION 1, 23-24 (Willem van Schendel & Itty Abraham 
eds., 2005); Bravo, Free Labor!, supra note 1, at 569-71 (discussing the “historical anomaly” 
of these increased border restrictions); Hathaway, supra note 1, at 26-27 (discussing the 
use of the Smuggling Protocol, an international treaty, to reinforce domestic migration 
controls); Aiko Joshi, The Face of Human Trafficking, 13 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 31, 36-38 
(2002) (tracing the trafficking of dislocated workers to the forces of economic globaliza-
tion); Wide Angle:  Dying to Leave (PBS television broadcast Sept. 25, 2003), available at 
http://www.pbs.org/wnet/wideangle/episodes/dying-to-leave/video-full-episode/1126 
(discussing rising barriers to migration in developed nations).   
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ment began in earnest in the mid-1990s and has continued to the 
present day.4  And in just a few short years, the federal criminal justice 
system has been converted into an important legal adjunct to the 
growing human and technological barriers along the border.5  Begin-
ning several years ago, the prosecutorial arm of the Department of 
Justice turned to the systematic prosecution of thousands of misde-
meanor illegal entry and felony reentry cases along the southern bor-
der.6  These prosecutions, which are conducted in a mere handful of 
federal districts, have had a huge impact on the shape of U.S. criminal 
justice.  Immigration prosecutions make up over fifty percent of all 
federal criminal prosecutions, handily outstripping prosecutions for 
drug crimes, weapons possession, and white collar crime.7 
As immigration restrictions and border enforcement have in-
creased, the sophistication and violence of the organizations that 
promote the illicit movement of people across borders—whether in 
the form of smuggling or trafficking—have also grown.8  In the U.S. 
4 See, e.g., Peter Andreas, The Transformation of Migrant Smuggling Across the U.S.-
Mexican Border (outlining the impact of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 
1986 and subsequent acts), in GLOBAL HUMAN SMUGGLING:  COMPARATIVE PERSPEC-
TIVES 107, 112-16 (David Kyle & Rey Koslowsky eds., 2001); Wayne A. Cornelius, Con-
trolling ‘Unwanted’ Immigration:  Lessons From the United States, 1993–2004, 31 J. ETHNIC & 
MIGRATION STUD. 775, 776 (2005) (describing the U.S. immigration-control strategy as 
launched by President Clinton and continued through the presidency of George W. 
Bush); Bill Ong Hing, The Dark Side of Operation Gatekeeper, 7 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & 
POL’Y 121, 127-28 (2001) (outlining Operation Gatekeeper’s emphasis on deterrence).  
In debates over immigration reform, the only changes that Congress has been able to 
agree upon and enact have been measures increasing physical border-defense mechan-
isms.  See Jennifer M. Chacón, Unsecured Borders:  Immigration Restrictions, Crime Control 
and National Security, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1827, 1829-30 (2007) (discussing failed immi-
gration reform bills and the passage of a law strengthening the border fence). 
5 See Jennifer M. Chacón, Managing Migration Through Crime, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 
SIDEBAR 135, 135-36 (2009), http://www.columbialawreview.org/articles/managing-
migration-through-crime (discussing the increasing use of criminal prosecutions as a 
tool for managing migration). 
6 Id. at 139-40. 
7 John Schwartz, Immigration Enforcement Fuels Spike in U.S. Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
22, 2009, at A16.  Since 2004, immigration prosecutions have topped the list of federal 
criminal prosecutions, outstripping federal drug and weapons prosecutions, and dwarf-
ing many other forms of federal criminal prosecutions.  See TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS 
ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE, IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT:  NEW FINDINGS (2005), http:// 
trac.syr.edu/tracins/latest/131 (“[I]mmigration matters now represent the single larg-
est group of all federal prosecutions, about one third (32%) of the total.  By compari-
son, narcotics and drugs, for many years the government’s dominant enforcement in-
terest, dropped to about a quarter of the total (27%) and weapons matters to slightly 
less than one out of ten (9%).”). 
8 See GLOBAL COMM’N ON INT’L MIGRATION, MIGRATION IN AN INTERCONNECTED 
WORLD:  NEW DIRECTIONS FOR ACTION 33 (2005), available at http://www.gcim.org/ 
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context, the recent rise in border enforcement has not only fueled vi-
olence along the southern border but also has made the northward 
journey much more difficult and expensive.9  As criminal networks re-
place mom-and-pop smuggling operations, migrants who rely on the 
services of these networks are vulnerable to debt bondage, kidnap-
ping, and exploitation.  In other words, the humans that comprise the 
cargo transported by professionalized networks of smugglers are in-
creasingly vulnerable to exploitation.10  For some migrants, what may 
begin as a contractual agreement to be smuggled converts into a traf-
ficking arrangement characterized by coercion during the course of 
the journey.11 
Moreover, U.S. immigration law and policy unintentionally helps 
traffickers assert control over victims once those victims are in the 
United States.  Unauthorized peoples are more vulnerable to threats 
because they know that efforts to seek legal recourse can result in pro-
tracted immigration detention, criminal prosecution, and, of course, 
removal.  The legal limbo of unauthorized migrants has left many mi-
grant laborers reluctant to report crimes12 and labor violations.13 
attachements/gcim-complete-report-2005.pdf (cautioning about these potentially de-
trimental effect of efforts to prevent irregular migration on the welfare of migrants); 
Andreas, supra note 4, at 112-16 (linking the boom in human-smuggling services to 
tighter border policing); Maggy Lee, Human Trade and the Criminalization of Irregular 
Migration, 33 INT’L J. SOC. L. 1, 1 (2005) (describing the range of criminal groups in-
volved in trafficking); cf. Gallagher, supra note 1, at 833-34 (“If international labor mi-
gration were as free as the trade in goods and services, then there would be no need to 
develop legal regimes to combat smuggling . . . . Unless and until a radical shift occurs 
in the structure and orientation of current migration regimes, there will be a market 
distortion; more people prepared (or forced) to move than safe and legal opportuni-
ties are available.  Traffickers and smugglers are a result of this anomaly.  Their exis-
tence and their future are tied up with its continuity.”). 
9 See, e.g., Andreas, supra note 4, at 112-16 (detailing the effects of the expansion of 
border controls along the southern U.S. border); Hing, supra note 4, at 135 (arguing that 
border controls redirect the flow of illegal immigration and extract a higher human toll). 
10 See Andreas, supra note 4, at 116-20 (arguing that smugglers now apply more 
dangerous tactics to avoid increased penalties); Jennifer M. Chacón, Misery and Myopia:  
Understanding the Failures of U.S. Efforts to Stop Human Trafficking, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2977, 3009-10 (2006) (describing how border militarization drove illegal immigrants 
to high-priced smugglers); Cornelius, supra note 4, at 779 (positing that border con-
trols force migrants to use paths that have more dangerous natural hazards); Lee, su-
pra note 8, at 1 (describing the risks inherent in trading people as “commodities”). 
11 See Dina Francesca Haynes, Exploitation Nation:  The Thin and Grey Legal Lines Be-
tween Trafficked Persons and Abused Migrant Laborers, 23 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. 
POL’Y 1, 48-50 (2009) (providing examples of “hypothetical migrants” to illustrate the 
sometimes fine line between trafficking and contractual agreements). 
12 See, e.g., Chacón, supra note 4, at 1886 (“[M]any non-citizens are reluctant to 
report crime because of their own fear of removal.”); Orde F. Kittrie, Federalism, Depor-
2010] Tensions and Trade-offs 1613 
The Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (TVPA)14 and its 
successive reauthorizations, including the Trafficking Victims Protec-
tion Reauthorization Act of 2003 (TVPRA 2003),15 the Trafficking Vic-
tims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2005 (TVPRA 2005),16 and the 
William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization 
Act of 2008 (TVPRA 2008),17 were designed to remedy some of the 
forces generated by U.S. immigration policy that have the effect of 
promoting trafficking in persons.  In particular, these laws not only 
targeted traffickers for unique punishment (over and above that 
which would apply to smugglers) but also created a legal space for un-
authorized migrant victims to come forward to report and seek pro-
tection from trafficking.18  Some of the relevant legal mechanisms in-
cluded the T visas that allow victims of trafficking to normalize their 
tation, and Crime Victims Afraid to Call the Police, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1449, 1455-56 (2006) 
(discussing sanctuary policies as a means of encouraging unauthorized migrants to re-
port crime); Leslye E. Orloff et al., Battered Immigrant Women’s Willingness to Call for Help 
and Police Response, 13 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 43, 67-68 (2003) (finding extremely low re-
porting rates for rape victims without lawful immigration status); Robert C. Davis & Edna 
Erez, Immigrant Populations as Victims:  Toward a Multicultural Criminal Justice System, NAT’L 
INST. JUST.:  RES. IN BRIEF, May 1998, at 1, 4-5, available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/ 
167571.pdf (discussing the unique hardships that discourage immigrants from report-
ing crimes and analyzing data related to who does and who does not report crimes). 
13 See Lora Jo Foo, The Vulnerable and Exploitable Immigrant Workforce and the Need for 
Strengthening Worker Protective Legislation, 103 YALE L.J. 2179, 2183 (1994) (explaining 
how the risk of deportation deters immigrants from reporting labor and employment 
violations); Dina Francesca Haynes, Used, Abused, Arrested and Deported:  Extending Immigra-
tion Benefits to Protect the Victims of Trafficking and to Secure the Prosecution of Traffickers, 26 
HUM. RTS. Q. 221, 257 (2004) (“A lack of viable and legal migration options leads people 
into trafficking; fear of deportation keeps them there.”); Leticia M. Saucedo, A New “U”:  
Organizing Victims and Protecting Immigrant Workers, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 891, 914-35 (2008) 
(discussing the effect of the U visa on reporting of labor and employment violations); 
Michael J. Wishnie, Immigrants and the Right to Petition, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 667, 669 (2003) 
(noting that many undocumented workers are reluctant “to report their harsh working 
conditions for fear they will attract the attention of immigration authorities”). 
14 Pub. L. No. 106-386, §§ 101–113, 114 Stat. 1466, 1466-91 (codified as amended 
at 22 U.S.C. §§ 7101–7110 (2006)). 
15 Pub. L. No. 108-193, 117 Stat. 2875 (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 8, 18 & 22 U.S.C.). 
16 Pub. L. No. 109-164, 119 Stat. 3558 (2006) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 18, 22 & 42 U.S.C.). 
17 Pub. L. No. 110-457, 122 Stat. 5044 (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 8, 18, 22 & 42 U.S.C.).  
18 See, e.g., Kelly E. Hyland, Protecting Human Victims of Trafficking:  An American 
Framework, 16 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 29, 62 (2001) (describing the Act’s three-tier ap-
proach targeting prevention, protection, and prosecution); Susan Tiefenbrun, The Cul-
tural, Political, and Legal Climate Behind the Fight to Stop Trafficking in Women:  William J. Clin-
ton’s Legacy to Women’s Rights, 12 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 855, 876-77 (2006) (same). 
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immigration status, at least temporarily; resources from the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services (HHS) that provide trafficking 
victims with a means of support and access to necessary services; and a 
clearly communicated policy of nonprosecution for trafficking vic-
tims.19  The reauthorizations of the TVPA also have added a private 
right of action for trafficking victims against their traffickers and add-
ed special protections for child victims.20 
The TVPA has made progress in ensuring the protection of traf-
ficking victims and the prosecution of traffickers in the United 
States.21  Since the original TVPA was enacted in 2000, over two thou-
sand individuals—both victims of trafficking and qualifying family 
members—have gained access to T visas.22  This not only allows them 
to normalize their legal status in the United States but also provides 
them with a range of services from HHS that are designed to provide 
them with a financial safety net and a source of treatment for the 
physical and psychological injuries that they have suffered as a result 
of their trafficking.23  Moreover, the U.S. government has successfully 
prosecuted over three hundred individuals for their participation in 
various trafficking schemes.24 
Unfortunately, the humanitarian aims of the TVPA are often hin-
dered because the goal of protecting exploited migrants frequently 
runs squarely into the competing goal of enforcing immigration laws.25  
19 For a discussion of these features of the TVPA, and critiques thereof, see, for ex-
ample, Dina Francesca Haynes, (Not) Found Chained to a Bed in a Brothel:  Conceptual, Legal, 
and Procedural Failures to Fulfill the Promise of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act, 21 GEO. 
IMMIGR. L.J. 337, 365-73 (2007), and Jayashri Srikantiah, Perfect Victims and Real Survivors:  
The Iconic Victim in Domestic Human Trafficking Law, 87 B.U. L. REV. 157, 179-84 (2007). 
20 The private right of action was added in the 2003 TVPRA.  For additional discus-
sion of the private right of action, see note 58 and accompanying text.  For a discussion 
of the additional protections for migrant children, see note 68 and accompanying text. 
21 For a relatively optimistic assessment of its effects, see, for example, Susan W. 
Tiefenbrun, Updating the Domestic and International Impact of the U.S. Victims of Trafficking 
Protection Act of 2000:  Does Law Deter Crime?, 38 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 249, 278-79 
(2006–2007). 
22 2009 ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. TO CONGRESS & ASSESSMENT OF U.S. GOV’T ACTIVITIES 
TO COMBAT TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS FISCAL YEAR 2008, at 35, available at http:// 
www.justice.gov/ag/annualreports/tr2008/agreporthumantrafficing2008.pdf [hereinaf-
ter ATT’Y GEN. 2008 TRAFFICKING REPORT]. 
23 For a discussion of benefits provided by HHS to trafficking victims, see id. at 9-23. 
24 See id. at 36 (providing data regarding the number of investigations undertaken 
by the FBI’s Civil Rights Unit pertaining to human trafficking). 
25 See, e.g., Chacón, supra note 10, at 3022-23 (arguing that the TVPA’s “unwilling-
ness to extend protections to ‘illegal workers’ absent a showing of their ‘innocence’ 
embeds into the TVPA the same immigration and labor law policies that have created a 
2010] Tensions and Trade-offs 1615 
The line between voluntary migrants who participate in smuggling 
schemes and unwilling trafficking victims—a line that is often murky at 
best26—has been vigilantly policed.27  The ability of public officials to use 
the tools of the TVPA to assist trafficking victims is thereby limited by 
the more powerful prerogatives of immigration enforcement.28 
This is not to suggest that the TVPA has failed.  U.S. antitrafficking 
efforts, like the international efforts to protect trafficking victims, have 
been important in protecting a small number of victims, punishing a 
small number of traffickers, and, perhaps most importantly, raising 
awareness about the nature and scope of the international trafficking 
problem.  These advances are worthy of recognition.  Nevertheless, it is 
equally important to acknowledge that antitrafficking efforts in the 
United States and elsewhere have been heavily constrained by the pol-
itics and policies of rigid immigration enforcement.  In the end, there 
is no way to eliminate the scourge of trafficking on the international 
level as long as cross-border movement is subject to the high degree of 
regulation and criminalization that characterizes the contemporary 
global order. 
More troublingly, some efforts to address the problem of traffick-
ing within the framework of heightened border restrictions have the 
perhaps unintended effect of reinforcing migrants’ vulnerability to 
exploitation.  This Article seeks to expose some of the tensions and 
trade-offs between immigration policy choices and antitrafficking ef-
forts.  Part I of this Article focuses on the ways in which antitrafficking 
advocacy and policies can actually fuel the discourse that drives re-
strictionist immigration policies.  Discussions regarding trafficking—
including media coverage of trafficking, law enforcement antitraffick-
ing-training efforts, and official statements on trafficking—have 
haven for trafficking and migrant exploitation”).  See generally Haynes, supra note 19; 
Srikantiah, supra note 19. 
26 See, e.g., BRIDGET ANDERSON & JULIA O’CONNELL DAVIDSON, TRAFFICKING—A DE-
MAND LED PROBLEM?:  A MULTI-COUNTRY PILOT STUDY 18 (2002), available at http:// 
www.unodc.org/pdf/brazil/trafficking-a%20demand%20led%20problem.pdf (discuss-
ing how the lack of distinction leads to research challenges); Bravo, Free Labor!, supra 
note 1, at 554-55 (describing a “flawed” distinction between trafficking and smug-
gling); Srikantiah, supra note 19, at 191-95 (“[S]muggling and trafficking are hard to 
distinguish from one another.”). 
27 See CATHERINE DAUVERGNE, MAKING PEOPLE ILLEGAL:  WHAT GLOBALIZATION 
MEANS FOR MIGRATION AND LAW 89-91 (2008) (discussing efforts to develop a bright-line 
distinction between smuggling and trafficking); Chacón, supra note 10, at 3027 (noting 
that smuggled individuals “are unlikely to receive the protections of the TVPA”). 
28 See Chacón, supra note 10, at 3027 (discussing how immigration enforcement and 
strict law enforcement standards are prioritized to the detriment of trafficking victims). 
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played into and compounded the myth of migrant criminality.  Rather 
than increasing the focus on the ways in which immigration enforce-
ment policies can foster exploitation, discussions about trafficking have 
tended to focus on particular bad actors.  And the “bad actors” that are 
scrutinized are neither the middle-class beneficiaries of labor exploita-
tion nor the customers who purchase services in the sex trade but the 
migrants who service the markets that these other actors create. 
While it is certainly desirable to punish traffickers, ignoring the 
complicity of the vast array of people who generate the markets that 
traffickers service results in a misleading view of the trafficking prob-
lem.  In popular discourse concerning the trafficking of migrants, the 
traffickers—almost always identified as noncitizen men or men of col-
or, but occasionally including noncitizen women—bear sole responsi-
bility for the human misery of trafficking.  Framing the trafficking 
problem in this way fits comfortably within the larger narrative that 
has been constructed around unauthorized migration—a narrative in 
which migrant laborers are presented as criminal interlopers, but 
their criminality is entirely detached from the conduct of the consum-
ers of their labor. 
Part II of this Article explores how growing attention to the traf-
ficking issue (in the United States and internationally) has occurred 
alongside, and has served as an additional justification for, the increas-
ing reliance on the criminal justice system to manage migration.  Sec-
tion II.A explores the extent to which references to trafficking have 
been used to justify, among other things, greater law enforcement 
presence along the U.S.-Mexico border, greater numbers of prosecu-
tors in border districts, and the rapid acceleration of immigration-
related prosecutions.  This has been the case even though very few of 
the resulting interdictions and prosecutions ultimately result directly 
in the protection of trafficking victims and even though the increased 
policing of the border and criminalization of migration can streng-
then the hand of traffickers.  Section II.B of this Article explores the 
development of state antitrafficking statutes and analyzes the extent to 
which these efforts can be understood as part of the larger trend of 
states and localities attempting to assert greater legal authority to par-
ticipate in immigration enforcement. 
By situating the issue of U.S. antitrafficking policies within the 
broader framework of U.S. immigration enforcement policies, this Ar-
ticle seeks to highlight some of the inherent tensions that emerge 
when nations embrace the goal of protecting trafficking victims while 
enforcing a highly restrictive immigration policy.  This is not to suggest 
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that antitrafficking efforts are hopeless or undesirable in the present 
world order.  To the contrary, it is clearly a positive development that 
certain victims are obtaining assistance and redress and that certain 
perpetrators are being fittingly punished.  However, by highlighting 
the tension between current restrictionist approaches to immigration 
and antitrafficking efforts, this Article serves to caution those who 
support more aggressive antitrafficking efforts to be sensitive to the 
ways in which such efforts can be (and have been) used to bolster 
immigration enforcement policies that can ultimately fuel the exploi-
tation lying at the heart of the global trafficking phenomenon. 
I.  FRAMING ANTITRAFFICKING POLICY WITHIN THE  
DISCOURSE OF MIGRANT CRIMINALITY 
International human trafficking is certainly not a new problem.  
This phenomenon has existed throughout history, and over the past 
century, the international community has addressed various aspects of 
the trafficking problem.29  There is no doubt that it took the Protocol 
to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially 
Women and Children (the “Trafficking Protocol” or “Protocol”),30 
however, to push the issue of international trafficking to the forefront 
of international legal concerns.  It was only after the enactment of the 
Trafficking Protocol that powerful nations, including the United 
States, began to address the problem of international trafficking in 
their own legislation and international foreign policy.31  The Protocol, 
and the domestic legislation it has engendered, have moved the  
antitrafficking agenda firmly into the sphere of criminal law enforce-
ment.  Section I.A discusses the positive and negative practical effects 
of framing the antitrafficking agenda in terms of the criminal law.  
Section I.B explores the extent to which this new framing has fueled a 
29 See, e.g., Convention on the Rights of the Child arts. 32-36, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 
U.N.T.S. 3 (prohibiting trafficking of children, exploitation of children, and forced or 
exploitative labor); Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women art. 6, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (prohibiting exploitation of the 
prostitution of women); International Agreement for the Suppression of the “White 
Slave Traffic,” May 18, 1904, 35 Stat. 1979, 1 L.N.T.S. 83 (providing protections for 
trafficked women).  
30 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially 
Women and Children, Nov. 15, 2000, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 108-16 (2004), 2237 
U.N.T.S. 319 [hereinafter Trafficking Protocol]. 
31 See infra notes 45-49 and accompanying text (discussing requirements of the 
Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and the resulting Trafficking Vic-
tims Protection Act in the United States). 
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discourse of migrant criminality that ironically increases the vulnera-
bility of migrants to exploitation. 
A.  Trafficking as an Immigration Crime 
The Trafficking Protocol was part of a broader effort by states to 
carve out an international cooperative agreement on transnational 
crime.32  This effort included not only a transnational crime conven-
tion33 and supplementary treaties on trafficking and migrant smug-
gling34 but also side agreements on illicit small-arms manufacture and 
trade.35  As such, treaty negotiators quite correctly and understandably 
treated international trafficking as a subset of international crime.36  
Trafficking is a crime.  Therefore, it is neither surprising nor proble-
matic to treat trafficking as a worthy subject of international criminal 
law and to use criminal law as a tool for deterring and punishing traf-
ficking offenses.37  Indeed, failure to prioritize trafficking crimes was 
akin to other international legal failures to address concerns emerg-
ing within the spheres of work and home—areas that were construed 
as “private” and where, not coincidentally, great harms were visited 
against socially marginalized groups, particularly women and children. 
Nevertheless, in placing the trafficking issue within the framework 
of an international criminal convention, the Trafficking Protocol 
32 See Gallagher, supra note 1, at 789-90 (recounting the initial meetings that even-
tually led to the Trafficking Protocol). 
33 United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, Nov. 15, 
2000, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 108-16 (2004), 2225 U.N.T.S. 209. 
34 Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, Nov. 15, 
2000, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 108-16 (2004), 2241 U.N.T.S. 480.  Smuggling is defined as 
“the procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other ma-
terial benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the person is 
not a national or a permanent resident.”  Id. art. III, ¶ a. 
35 Protocol Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their 
Parts and Components and Ammunition, Supplementing the United Nations Conven-
tion Against Transnational Organized Crime, G.A. Res. 55/255, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/55/255 ( June 8, 2001). 
36 See Trafficking Protocol, supra note 30, pmbl., at 343 (“[S]upplementing the 
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime with an interna-
tional instrument for the prevention, suppression and punishment of trafficking in 
persons, especially women and children, will be useful in preventing and combating 
that crime . . . .”). 
37 See, e.g., HILARY CHARLESWORTH & CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THE BOUNDARIES OF IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW:  A FEMINIST ANALYSIS 56-59 (2000) (discussing and dissecting this 
public/private dichotomy); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY 
OF THE STATE 237-40 (1989) (locating much of the discrimination faced by women 
outside the sphere of public recognition and protection). 
2010] Tensions and Trade-offs 1619 
shifted antitrafficking priorities from the protection of human rights 
to the prosecution of international criminals.38  Critics assert that, in 
so doing, the Trafficking Protocol took an approach to antitrafficking 
that bolstered international prosecutorial efforts at the expense of in-
ternational efforts—and agencies—dedicated to enhancing interna-
tional human rights.39  Moreover, this approach allowed governments 
to implement harsh border-control measures under the guise of insti-
tuting antitrafficking legislation.40 
In response to this criticism, defenders of the Trafficking Protocol 
approach have noted that, prior to the treaties negotiated at Palermo, 
the international community was not taking any truly effective meas-
ures to combat the international trafficking problem.41  While a prose-
cution-centered approach has drawbacks, it has the virtue of attracting 
international attention to the issue of trafficking and motivating po-
werful state actors to consider the trafficking problem worthy of both 
international and domestic attention.  Prior to the negotiation of the 
38 See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Bruch, Models Wanted:  The Search for an Effective Response to 
Human Trafficking, 40 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1, 4 (2004) (noting that, with regard to traffick-
ing, “the predominant approach has come from a law enforcement perspective”); Ja-
nie Chuang, The United States As Global Sheriff:  Using Unilateral Sanctions to Combat Hu-
man Trafficking, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 437, 448 (2006) (noting the nonobligatory nature 
of the victim-protection provisions); Anne Gallagher, Human Rights and the New UN Pro-
tocols on Trafficking and Migrant Smuggling:  A Preliminary Analysis, 23 HUM. RTS. Q. 975, 
976, 989 (2001) (noting that the law enforcement concerns dominated negotiations and 
that victim-protection provisions of the Protocol are not obligatory); see also Gallagher, 
supra note 1, at 790-91 (noting that the Protocol did a better job with regard to establish-
ing a structure for punishing traffickers than for protecting the rights of victims, but ob-
serving that sufficient (particularly regional) mechanisms exist to fill that gap). 
39 See, e.g., Hathaway, supra note 1, at 4-6 (“[T]he fight against human trafficking is 
more fundamentally in tension with core human rights goals than has generally been 
recognized.”).  But cf. Gallagher, supra note 1, at 792-93 (noting several advantages to 
the international human rights approach vis-à-vis the criminal approach, but ultimately 
concluding that the latter approach has had greater practical effect). 
40 See Hathaway, supra note 1, at 6 (“[T]he border control emphasis inherent in 
the Trafficking Protocol and its companion Smuggling Protocol has provided states 
with a reason—or at least a rationalization—for the intensification of broadly based 
efforts to prevent the arrival or entry of unauthorized noncitizens.”). 
41 Anne Gallagher noted this point in her response to James Hathaway: 
Despite an impressive array of international legal protections, it was clear to 
our organizations that forced labor, child labor, debt bondage, forced mar-
riage, and commercial sexual exploitation of children and adults were flou-
rishing, unchecked in many parts of the world. . . . We all believed that traf-
ficking was indeed an appropriate focus for international law.  We also agreed 
that the existing international legal framework was woefully inadequate, and 
the chances of the human rights system coming to the rescue were slim. 
Gallagher, supra note 1, at 790. 
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Trafficking Protocol, antitrafficking efforts were quite marginalized.42  
In contrast, since the passage of the Trafficking Protocol, internation-
al human rights organizations have been guided by the coherent defi-
nitions supplied by the criminal convention in devising and supervis-
ing responses to trafficking.  In so doing, they have raised the profile 
of the fight against exploitation.43  For defenders of the Trafficking 
Protocol, the gains made in the fight against international trafficking 
since 1999 far outweigh the costs of shifting the antitrafficking para-
digm from a predominantly human rights–based to a predominantly 
criminal law–based approach.44 
U.S. antitrafficking efforts have prompted a similar split of opi-
nion.  Comprehensive U.S. antitrafficking legislation never achieved 
momentum until after the completion of the Trafficking Protocol.  
However, the Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, 
which was the parent instrument of the Trafficking Protocol, required 
state parties to incorporate a trafficking offense into domestic law.45  
In response, the United States enacted the TVPA.46  With some nar-
42 See id. at 792 (“When trafficking belonged exclusively to human rights, there was 
one long ago treaty that nobody but the fringe dwellers intent on abolishing prostitu-
tion cared about, occasional, confused reports emanating from a marginal and margi-
nalized body (the UN Working Group on Contemporary Forms of Slavery), and very 
little else. . . . [N]ot even the treaty bodies were much help.” (footnote omitted)).  For 
a more detailed critique of the Working Group on Contemporary Forms of Slavery, 
see, for example, Hathaway, supra note 1, at 20-24. 
43 See Gallagher, supra note 1, at 824-25 (discussing the development of interna-
tional institutions and norms that have flowed from the Trafficking Protocol). 
44 See id. at 824 (arguing that the increased attention to both private and govern-
mental obligations to prevent exploitation “lays to rest any concerns that the global 
campaign against trafficking has wasted effort and resources”). 
45 United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, supra note 
33, art. 34, ¶ 2.  By 2008, 98 of the world’s 155 countries had “adopted a specific offence 
criminalizing trafficking in persons.”  U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, GLOBAL REPORT 
ON TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS 22 (2009), available at http://www.unodc.org/ 
documents/Global_Report_on_TIP.pdf. 
46 Pub. L. No. 106-386, §§ 101–113, 114 Stat. 1466, 1466-91 (codified as amended at 
22 U.S.C. §§ 7101–7110 (2006)).  The Council of Europe’s Convention on Action Against 
Trafficking in Humans entered into force on February 1, 2008; as of March 9, 2010, 
twenty-six countries have ratified it.  See ROSARIO PARDO, COUNCIL OF EUROPE CONVEN-
TION ON ACTION AGAINST TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS:  HANDBOOK FOR PARLIAMEN-
TARIANS app. II (2009), available at http://assembly.coe.int/committeedocs/2007/ 
Trafficking-human-beings_E.pdf.  The convention purports to address the trafficking 
problem “with a view to victim protection measures and international cooperation.”  
Council of Europe, Council of Europe Convention on Action Against Trafficking in Human Be-
ings and Its Explanatory Report, ¶ 37, at 32, C.E.T.S. No. 197 (May 16, 2005), available at 
http://www.coe.int/T/E/human_rights/trafficking/PDF_conv_197_trafficking_e.pdf. It 
is interesting that the European Convention highlights protection, whereas the U.S. 
model implicitly elevates prosecution as the most important antitrafficking goal. 
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rowing, it borrowed the international definition of trafficking47 and 
also engaged in an approach focused on prosecution of traffickers, 
prevention of trafficking, and protection of victims.48  One of the most 
frequent criticisms of the U.S. antitrafficking legislation is that it over-
emphasizes prosecution, and that it often does so at the expense of 
victim protection.49 
As in the context of the International Protocol, it is important not 
to overstate this argument.  First of all, it is not clear that antitraffick-
ing legislation aimed primarily at victim protection would have gar-
nered congressional support.  To the extent that positive steps have 
been taken toward curbing international trafficking, it is only because 
advocates recognized the strong support that could be brought to bear 
for a prosecution-centered bill.50  Second, the TVPA created the legisla-
47 See Chacón, supra note 10, at 2984-85 (noting that the TVPA provides protections 
and benefits only for victims of “severe forms of trafficking in persons”—a category that 
is slightly narrower than that covered by the Protocol’s definition of trafficking). 
48 See 22 U.S.C. § 7101(a) (laying out the threefold purposes of the Act).  
49 See, e.g., Claire Bishop, The Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000:  Three Years 
Later, 41 INT’L MIGRATION 219, 227 (2003) (advocating for a two-step immigration 
process in order to fulfill the law enforcement and victim-protection goals); Bravo, Ex-
ploring, supra note 1, at 240-43 (questioning whether trafficking can be solved without 
greater attention to root causes); Joan Fitzpatrick, Trafficking as a Human Rights Viola-
tion:  The Complex Intersection of Legal Frameworks for Conceptualizing and Combating Traf-
ficking, 24 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1143, 1166-67 (2003) (arguing that more than simple law 
enforcement is needed to combat trafficking); Haynes, supra note 19, at 345-46 (assert-
ing that victim protection is often conditioned on the willingness of victims to coope-
rate with law enforcement); Hussein Sadruddin et al., Human Trafficking in the United 
States:  Expanding the Victim Protection Act Beyond Prosecution Witnesses, 16 STAN. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 379, 381 (2005) (arguing that the Act is more concerned with prosecution 
than victim protection); Srikantiah, supra note 19, at 159-60 (arguing that allocating 
the responsibility for identifying trafficking victims to law enforcement investigators 
and prosecutors leads to “a failure to identify . . . those who do not present themselves 
as good prosecution witnesses” and yields “non-uniform results”); Joyce Koo Dalrym-
ple, Book Note, Human Trafficking:  Protecting Human Rights in the Trafficking Victims Pro-
tection Act, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 451, 454-56 (2005) (reviewing CRAIG MCGILL, 
HUMAN TRAFFIC:  SEX, SLAVES & IMMIGRATION (2003)) (maintaining that the require-
ments trafficking victims must meet to qualify for protection are overly stringent); De-
velopments in the Law:  Jobs and Borders, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2171, 2193-2202 (2005) (posit-
ing that the overemphasis of prosecution-oriented components of the TVPA, relative 
to components of the Act dedicated to victim protection and global prevention, ac-
counts for the Act’s shortcomings). 
50 The TVPA and the accompanying immigration-related provisions of the Vi-
olence Against Women Act (VAWA) are among the very few recent pieces of legisla-
tion that liberalize immigration in any way.  Almost all immigration-related legislation, 
and certainly all major immigration bills passed since 1990, have increased restrictions 
on migration and eased barriers to removal.  See, e.g., Secure Fence Act of 2006, Pub. L. 
No. 109-367, 120 Stat. 2638 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1103, 1701 
(2006)); REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 302 (codified as amended 
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tive impetus behind the State Department’s annual Trafficking in Per-
sons (TIP) report, which has come to function as an influential moni-
toring and unilateral compliance regime for international trafficking.51  
Finally, sustained criticism of the original TVPA as insufficiently atten-
tive to humanitarian and human rights concerns has yielded a num-
ber of ameliorative developments in the passage of reauthorizing leg-
islation in 2003, 2005, and 2008, as well as in the implementation of 
regulations.  Collectively, these changes have helped to address some 
of the flaws in the initial legislation that tilted it too heavily toward the 
needs of prosecutors at the expense of victims. 
One example of an ameliorative development in reauthorizing 
legislation is the change that Congress made to the requirements for 
the T visa.52  A T visa is the means by which a noncitizen victim of traf-
ficking can obtain temporary lawful status, which can be converted in-
to lawful permanent residency in some cases.53  In order to receive a T 
visa, the noncitizen must be “a victim of a severe form of trafficking in 
persons,” must be present in the United States, and, perhaps most 
controversially, must assist law enforcement by cooperating with “any 
reasonable request” from a law enforcement agent concerning the in-
vestigation and prosecution of her trafficker.54  In the 2005 reauthori-
in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.); Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Respon-
sibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 304, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-587 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.); Antiterrorism and Effective Death Pe-
nalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 28 and 42 U.S.C.). 
51 See Gallagher, supra note 1, at 826-27 (exploring the function of the TIP re-
port).  There are many criticisms of the State Department’s methodology and practices 
with regard to the TIP report.  See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, HUMAN 
TRAFFICKING:  BETTER DATA, STRATEGY, AND REPORTING NEEDED TO ENHANCE U.S. AN-
TITRAFFICKING EFFORTS ABROAD 26-28 (2006), available at http://www.gao.gov/ 
new.items/d06825.pdf (listing credibility problems with the TIP reports).  Moreover, 
because of the imperfect overlap between U.S. antitrafficking goals and international 
trafficking policy, it is not clear that State Department monitoring and threats of sanc-
tions effectively advance the specific goals of the international antitrafficking regime.  
See, e.g., Chuang, supra note 38, at 466-73 (comparing U.S. and international antitraf-
ficking goals).  But the reports have highlighted and encouraged action on a number 
of international trafficking issues that had previously received insufficient attention. 
52 The T visa was created by section 107(e) of the TVPA.  Trafficking Victims Pro-
tection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, § 107(e), 114 Stat. 1466, 1477-79 (codified as 
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(15)). 
53 After three years in “T status,” T visa recipients may apply for permanent resi-
dency pursuant to immigration regulations governing status adjustments.  See 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1255(l). 
54 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(T)(i)(I).  A T visa requires a determination by the Attor-
ney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security that the noncitizen (1) is a victim of 
a “severe form of trafficking,” as defined in 22 U.S.C. § 7102 (2006); (2) “is physically 
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zation of the TVPA, Congress relaxed the law enforcement coopera-
tion requirement by allowing the Secretary of Homeland Security, in 
consultation with the Attorney General, to find a request from law en-
forcement officials “unreasonable” if “a trafficking victim, due to psy-
chological or physical trauma, is unable to cooperate with a request for 
assistance.”55  Although further liberalizing adjustments are certainly in 
order,56 these changes suggest that pressure by critics57 to better align 
the balance between prosecution and protection is having an effect. 
A second example of an improvement in antitrafficking legislation 
in the years since the 2000 enactment of the TVPA is the addition of a 
private right of action for trafficking victims who wish to bring civil ac-
tions against their traffickers.58  Individuals who have suffered severe 
forms of exploitation can now bring lawsuits in cases in which the 
government did not choose to proceed with criminal trials.  One of 
the areas in which this is having effect is cases involving labor exploita-
tion.  Throughout the TVPA’s existence, the government has prose-
cuted fewer cases of labor trafficking than sex trafficking.59  Moreover, 
present in the United States” or its territories or possessions, or a port of entry thereto; 
(3) “has complied with any reasonable request for assistance” in the investigation or 
prosecution of acts of trafficking; and (4) would suffer “extreme hardship involving un-
usual and severe harm upon removal.”  See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(T)(i). 
55 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(T)(iii). 
56 See Srikantiah, supra note 19, at 181 n.141 (noting that law enforcement agents 
are likely to implement this statutory provision in the same manner as the certification 
required under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(T)(i) and therefore that “prosecutors and in-
vestigators will continue to serve in a gate-keeping function as to identification of traf-
ficking victims”). 
57 For an earlier criticism of the law enforcement certification requirement, see 
Sadruddin et al., supra note 49, at 410-13, in which the authors propose an exception 
to certification be allowed in some cases.  The T visa was based on the model used for 
the S visa.  Because the T visa is based on the model of prior visas designed to assist law 
enforcement, it is not designed primarily to protect victims’ rights.  See Chacón, supra 
note 10, at 3026-27 (criticizing the reliance on the S visa model without sensitivity to 
the different contexts in which the two visas are issued). 
58 18 U.S.C. § 1595 (2006). 
59 See ATT’Y GEN. 2008 TRAFFICKING REPORT, supra note 22, at 38 (“In FY 2008, ICE 
opened 432 human trafficking investigations, which consisted of 170 investigations of 
forced labor and 262 investigations of commercial sexual exploitation . . . . ICE made 
189 criminal arrests for offenses related to human trafficking.  Of the 189 arrests, 128 
were for crimes involving sexual exploitation and 61 were for forced labor related viola-
tions.”); CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT ON ACTIVITIES TO COMBAT 
HUMAN TRAFFICKING:  FISCAL YEARS 2001–2005, at 25-27 (2006), available at http:// 
www.justice.gov/crt/crim/part_5.pdf [hereinafter DOJ REPORT] (presenting statistics 
on sex trafficking and labor trafficking cases filed); see also Grace Chang & Kathleen 
Kim, Reconceptualizing Approaches to Human Trafficking:  New Directions and Perspectives from 
the Field(s), 3 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 317, 336 (2007) (noting that sex trafficking prosecu-
tions are more numerous than labor trafficking prosecutions and arguing  that “[t]hese 
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the government’s labor trafficking prosecutions have tended to focus 
on noncitizens, not on U.S. companies.60  By contrast, private actions 
brought under the TVPA have targeted, among other entities, corpo-
rations that have engaged in exploitative labor practices.61  Of course, 
it would be overstating the matter to claim that the addition of the 
private right of action has had a very large impact on the trafficking 
problem.  Empirical study has demonstrated that only a small handful 
of complainants have filed such suits since the creation of the right of 
action in 2003.62  Nevertheless, the private right of action, which is 
mirrored in several state antitrafficking provisions,63 provides another 
example of a liberalizing measure undertaken in response to outside 
critiques of the TVPA.64 
A third improvement to the TVPA is that with each reauthoriza-
tion, the TVPA has expanded the scope of legal protections available 
to migrants who are minors.  This is true even for children who are 
not victims of trafficking.  The 2008 reauthorization provides for volun-
tary departure65 for minors at no expense to the child66 and also re-
numbers are disproportionate to estimates from non-governmental organizations and 
academic researchers asserting that approximately one-half to two-thirds of all traffick-
ing in the U.S. occurs in non-sex related industries”). 
60 See, e.g., ATT’Y GEN. 2008 TRAFFICKING REPORT, supra note 22, app. B at 83-86 
(listing “examples of cases,” none of which involve corporate defendants). 
61 See, e.g., David v. Signal Int’l, LLC, No. 08-1220, 2009 WL 5215326, at *2 (E.D. 
La. Dec. 28, 2009) (explaining that plaintiffs alleged “horrible” conditions); Com-
plaint, Adhikari v. Daoud & Partners, No. 08-05626, 2008 WL 3978577 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 
27, 2008) (alleging human trafficking by a corporation).  Indeed, one empirical study 
conducted in 2007 found no civil claims of sex trafficking but identified thirty-four la-
bor trafficking allegations across eighteen separate complaints.  See Jennifer S. Nam, 
Note, The Case of the Missing Case:  Examining the Civil Right of Action for Human Traffick-
ing Victims, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1671 (2007) (examining U.S. District Court 
complaints alleging claims under 18 U.S.C. § 1595). 
62 See Nam, supra note 61, at 1671 (arguing that the number of cases filed “pales in 
comparison” to the estimated number of trafficking incidents). 
63 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 52.5 (West 2007) (allowing civil suits for trafficking 
violations); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-571i (Supp. 2009) (authorizing civil actions for traf-
ficking victims); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 772.104 (West 2005 & Supp. 2009) (allowing civil 
suits); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-3.5-3 (West Supp. 2008) (allowing civil trafficking suits). 
64 See Kathleen Kim & Kusia Hreschynshyn, Human Trafficking Private Right of Ac-
tion:  Civil Rights for Trafficked Persons in the United States, 16 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 1 
(2004) (exploring the benefits of the private right of action); Kathleen Kim, The Traf-
ficked Worker as Private Attorney General:  A Model for Enforcing the Civil Rights of Undocu-
mented Workers, 2009 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 247 (same). 
65 “Voluntary departure” is a legal term of art defined as per the parameters estab-
lished by the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 240B, 8 U.S.C. § 1229c (2006).  
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quires that, “to the greatest extent practicable,” the Secretary of Health 
and Human Services provide unaccompanied minors with access to 
counsel, including free access where necessary.67  These and other 
changes to the legal status of noncitizen minors68 provide direct and in-
direct means of identifying and protecting child trafficking victims. 
On the regulatory side, guidelines for the U visa, which was 
created in the 2000 TVPA, were finally promulgated in September 
2007.69  The U visa provides a mechanism for normalizing the status of 
noncitizens who may not be eligible for T visas because they do not 
qualify as victims of “severe form[s] of trafficking in persons.”70  The U 
visa provides an alternative remedy for these individuals and also 
opens up a possible means of protecting a range of individuals who, 
although not “trafficking victims,” have been subjected to various 
forms of exploitation and abuse, including labor exploitation.71 
These, and other, changes that Congress—and, in the case of the 
U visa regulations, the executive branch—have made to the TVPA 
over the past decade illustrate the positive effect of sustained criticism 
regarding the TVPA’s initial overemphasis on criminal enforcement at 
the expense of victim protection.  These changes do not, however, al-
ter the fundamental balance of the law, which still prioritizes prosecu-
tion over victim protection.  That implementation of antitrafficking 
efforts by the Department of Homeland Security has been situated in 
the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) branch of the De-
partment, rather than U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 
66 See William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-457, § 235(a)(5)(D)(ii), 122 Stat. 5044, 5077 (codified as 
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1232(a)(5)(D)(ii)).   
67 Id. § 235(c)(5) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1232(c)(5)). 
68 For a complete discussion of the legal relief provided for minors under the 2008 
reauthorization, see generally Deborah Lee et al., Update on Legal Relief Options for Unac-
companied Alien Children Following the Enactment of the William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims 
Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, AILA InfoNet Doc. No. 09021830 (Feb. 19, 2009).  
69 The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), through the United States Citi-
zenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), issued the U visa regulation on September 
17, 2007, which became effective thirty days after its approval.  New Classification for Vic-
tims of Criminal Activity; Eligibility for “U” Nonimmigrant Status, 72 Fed. Reg. 53,014 
(Sept. 17, 2007) (codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 103, 212, 214, 248, 274a & 299 (2009)). 
70 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(T)(i)(I); see also supra note 54 (discussing T visa re-
quirements).  
71 New Classification for Victims of Criminal Activity; Eligibility for “U” Nonimmi-
grant Status, 72 Fed. Reg. at 53,036.  For a complete discussion of how the U visa could 
be used as a tool to enhance workplace protection, see Saucedo, supra note 13. 
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(USCIS),72 demonstrates that the capture and prosecution of traffick-
ers is the mechanism by which DHS hopes to address the trafficking 
problem.  Victim assistance is subjugated to the first-order priority of 
immigration enforcement. 
As in the context of domestic violence, one could justify a law en-
forcement–centered approach by arguing that the government’s wil-
lingness to use the criminal law as a tool to combat trafficking demon-
strates its serious commitment to dealing with this issue.73  When  
antitrafficking policy is limited to humanitarian responses to victims, 
this can send a signal to perpetrators that their actions are not serious 
enough to warrant criminal punishment.  Obviously, this is not the 
message that the government ought to send to traffickers. 
On the other hand, one can accept the need to treat trafficking as a 
serious crime and still design a system that strikes a different balance 
between prosecution and victim protection.74  For example, a victim-
centered approach to antitrafficking policy would not contain a default 
requirement that victims of trafficking undergo the difficulties of partic-
72 See Press Release, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, ICE Gives Voice to 
Victims of Human Trafficking in the United States (Nov. 2, 2009) [hereinafter ICE Press 
Release], available at http://www.ice.gov/pi/nr/0911/091102washingtondc.htm  (“As a 
primary mission area, ICE has the overall goal of preventing human trafficking in the 
United States by prosecuting the traffickers, and rescuing and protecting the victims.”).  
During the Symposium at which this Article was presented, J.J. Rosenbaum discussed the 
difficulties that arise from the fact that ICE does the initial law enforcement screening to 
determine whether an individual qualifies as a trafficking victim.  J.J. Rosenbaum, Re-
marks at the University of Pennsylvania Law Review Symposium:  Trafficking in Sex and 
Labor:  Domestic and International Responses (Nov. 13, 2009). 
73 For a discussion and critique of the ways in which sexual and domestic violence 
long have been considered part of the “private” sphere and not subject to public legal 
constraints, see, for example, ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND FEMIN-
IST LAWMAKING 87-97 (2000) and Sally Goldfarb, Public Rights for “Private” Wrongs:  Sex-
ual Harassment and the Violence Against Women Act, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASS-
MENT LAW 516 (Catharine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2004). 
74 See, e.g., Carole Angel, Immigration Relief for Human Trafficking Victims:  Focusing 
the Lens on the Human Rights of Victims, 7 MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 23, 
31 (2007) (arguing for a decoupling of criminal law goals from efforts to provide aid to 
victims); Marisa Silenzi Cianciarulo, Modern-Day Slavery and Cultural Bias:  Proposals for 
Reforming the U.S. Visa System for Victims of International Human Trafficking, 7 NEV. L.J. 
826, 831 (2007) (same); Tala Hartsough, Asylum for Trafficked Women:  Escape Strategies 
Beyond the T Visa, 13 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 77, 98 (2002) (same); Charles Song & 
Suzy Lee, Between a Sharp Rock and a Very Hard Place:  The Trafficking Victims Protection Act 
and the Unintended Consequences of the Law Enforcement Cooperation Requirement, 1 INTER-
CULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV. 133, 135 (2006) (same); Jayashri Srikantiah, Remarks at 
the University of Pennsylvania Law Review Symposium:  Trafficking in Sex and Labor:  
Domestic and International Responses (Nov. 13, 2009) (proposing modifications of 
the law enforcement certification requirements for T visas).  
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ipating in criminal prosecution75 in order to receive protection.  Elimi-
nating such barriers to victim protection would be consistent with the 
government’s approach in other areas of the law.  A domestic violence 
victim, for example, is not required to serve as a prosecution witness 
against her abuser to receive a restraining order or shelter; she is simply 
entitled to these legal and physical protections.  The same ought to be 
true of the trafficking victim.  A human rights–centered approach 
would link the protection of victims directly to the violation, not to the 
needs of the government seeking to prosecute the violation.76 
What complicates the situation in the case of the noncitizen traf-
ficking victim in need of a T visa is that the victim frequently is present 
in the United States in violation of the nation’s immigration laws.  Po-
licymakers are clearly reluctant to develop any antitrafficking policies 
that could potentially encourage unlawful immigration.77  Lawmakers 
seek to maintain clear distinctions between noncitizens who have vo-
luntarily contracted to be smuggled into the country and those who 
are here as a direct consequence of force, fraud, or coercion.78 
The vigilant policing of the line between smuggling and traffick-
ing occurs not only in the United States but in all developed coun-
tries.  One writer has characterized this line as “an all-important line 
in the battle for sovereignty and the nation-state as traditionally un-
derstood, and for maintaining the clear bright line between us and 
75 See, e.g., Sadruddin et al., supra note 49, at 398-406, 413-16 (describing the psy-
chological trauma associated with being trafficked and testifying as a trafficking victim 
in a criminal trial). 
76 See DAUVERGNE, supra note 27, at 85.  The linking of legal protections to coop-
eration with law enforcement is increasingly common in immigration law.  See, e.g., No-
ra V. Demleitner, Immigration Threats and Rewards:  Effective Law Enforcement Tools in the 
“War” on Terrorism?, 51 EMORY L.J. 1059, 1073 (2002) (“[I]mmigration law . . . can also 
be employed as an incentive or a reward for cooperation and information provided in 
criminal investigations.  This reward function has grown in importance as other immi-
gration benefits have been restricted or eliminated, including deportation waivers.”). 
77 See Chacón, supra note 10, at 3021-22 (describing congressional opposition to 
providing assistance to trafficking victims who consented to their initial smuggling but 
later became victims of exploitation); Srikantiah, supra note 19, at 191 n.194 (“The 
House Judiciary Committee, for example, imposed an annual cap of five thousand T 
visas ‘[i]n order that this bill never become a general amnesty program for smuggled 
aliens.’  Representative Chris Smith, the bill’s sponsor, explained that the cap was ne-
cessary to ‘prevent this form of relief from being abused’ and ‘prevent large numbers 
of aliens from falsely claiming to be trafficking victims.’” (citation omitted) (quoting 
H.R. REP. NO. 106-487, pt. 2, at 18 (2000); 146 CONG. REC. 18,056, 18,056-57 (2000) 
(statement of Rep. Smith))).  
78 See Chacón, supra note 10, at 3022-23 (explaining that under the TVPA, assis-
tance is limited for “individuals who may have played some volitional role in their 
transportation and employment, but who are now trapped in virtual slavery”). 
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them that keeps the status quo for migration law in place.”79  This ob-
servation raises the fundamental critique to which I now turn:  while 
antitrafficking legislation has been revised to better assist victims, at a 
broader level, antitrafficking discourse at times has drawn upon and 
perpetuated a discourse that compounds myths of migrant criminality. 
B.  Victim Vulnerability and the Myth of Migrant Criminality 
As previously noted, global social, economic, and political forces 
have contributed in complex ways to the development of the interna-
tional trafficking epidemic.80  Yet the discourse around trafficking—
including media coverage of trafficking, law enforcement antitraffick-
ing training efforts, and official statements on trafficking—has tended 
to focus not on these complex global forces but on particularly “bad 
actors.”  The “bad actors” that are scrutinized tend to be other nonci-
tizens involved in supplying certain markets with trafficked persons 
rather than the population that consumes the goods and services that 
these trafficking victims provide. 
One can see this in the Department of Justice’s public statements 
concerning antitrafficking prosecutions.  For several years, the De-
partment frequently published trafficking bulletins in which it dis-
cussed its successful trafficking prosecutions.81  Although that practice 
has ended, the Department continues to publicize its successful traf-
ficking prosecutions82 and to summarize some of the most notable 
cases in its annual report to Congress.83  The striking feature of the 
case summaries is that they highlight cases in which virtually every de-
fendant is a noncitizen or member of a minority racial group.84  None 
of the cases listed in the Attorney General’s 2008 report involves a 
corporate defendant.85  ICE, which is now tasked with the mission of 
antitrafficking enforcement, takes a similar approach; a recent press 
79 DAUVERGNE, supra note 27, at 70; see also id. at 90-92 (providing examples re-
garding this distinction). 
80 See supra notes 1-13 and accompanying text. 
81 For a summary of the cases discussed in several of these bulletins, see Chacón, 
supra note 10, at 3036 n.341. 
82 See ATT’Y GEN. 2008 TRAFFICKING REPORT, supra note 22, at 41 (reporting that 
the Civil Rights Division and the United States Attorneys’ Offices collectively investi-
gated a record-setting 183 trafficking cases, “charged 82 defendants in 40 cases[,] and 
obtained 77 convictions” in fiscal year 2008). 
83 See id. app. B at 83-86. 
84 Id.  For a description of the three possible exceptions—United States v. Webster, 
United States v. Corliss, and United States v. Pepe—see id. app. B, at 85. 
85 ATT’Y GEN. 2008 TRAFFICKING REPORT, supra note 22, app. B at 83-86. 
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release discussing ICE antitrafficking efforts highlights two cases.86  
The first involved defendants Lassissi Afolabi, Akouavi Kpade Afolabi, 
Derek Hounakey, and Geoffrey Kouevi, who were involved in large-
scale trafficking and smuggling activities.87  The second involved de-
fendants Amador Cortes-Meza, Francisco Cortes-Meza, Raul Cortes-
Meza, Juan Cortes-Meza, and Edison Wagner Rosa-Tort of Atlanta, 
who were engaged in smuggling and trafficking activities, including 
trafficking minors into prostitution.88  Both of these cases involved se-
rious acts of trafficking.  There is no doubt that the perpetrators of 
such crimes deserve punishment.  On the other hand, in using these 
cases to highlight ICE enforcement efforts on the very page on which 
ICE requests public participation in reporting trafficking, ICE primes 
the public to look for—and report—a certain kind of trafficker. 
The choices made by the government concerning which prosecu-
tions to publicize may be overdetermined.  A significant number of 
traffickers are noncitizens.  That is inevitable given the international 
nature of the industry and the fact that many of the vulnerable popu-
lations subject to exploitation live in developing countries.  Moreover, 
some traffickers operating in the United States are noncitizens—
including coethnics who exploit individuals in their own communities 
who lack legal status. 
At the same time, it is clear that there must be a broader market 
for the services provided by trafficked workers and that middle-class 
citizens of all backgrounds are implicated in exploitation.  The  
antitrafficking law very clearly provides tools for prosecuting those 
who knowingly profit from trafficked labor—a provision that ought to 
allow for a prosecution strategy that targets demand more effectively.  
For example, many well-known corporations have profited from the 
low cost of vulnerable migrant labor forces.89  While these companies 
86 ICE Press Release, supra note 72. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 See, e.g., Sherri Day, Jury Clears Tyson Foods in Use of Illegal Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 27, 2003, at A14 (noting that Tyson managers were exonerated in a jury trial but 
including concessions from one defendant that “there were people at Tyson who had 
done things wrong” in hiring unauthorized workers, although “he and the other two 
men charged had no knowledge of what their colleagues were doing”); Steven Green-
house, Wal-Mart to Pay U.S. $11 Million in Lawsuit on Immigrant Workers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
19, 2005, at A1 (discussing Wal-Mart’s settlement with the federal government regard-
ing accusations it employed illegal immigrants to clean its stores); Julia Preston, Child 
Labor Charges Are Sought Against Kosher Meat Plant in Iowa, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2008, at 
A15 (discussing widespread labor violations at a meatpacking plant that was the site of 
a massive immigration enforcement raid in May 2008).  
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and their executives have sometimes been fined in connection with 
immigration violations and other criminal matters,90 none has had to 
face trafficking penalties. 
Antitrafficking policy at the state level appears to follow the same 
patterns as federal antitrafficking prosecutions, though the data avail-
able at the state level are sparser than at the federal level.  In spite of a 
huge wave of antitrafficking legislation enacted at the state level over 
the past decade,91 very few individuals have been prosecuted for violat-
ing state antitrafficking laws.92  Of the few who have been prosecuted, 
available evidence suggests that they tend to be individuals prosecuted 
for sex trafficking (usually of children).93  Many state officials maintain 
that they do not believe that trafficking is an issue in their jurisdiction.94 
As officials have worked to train individuals to recognize traffick-
ing situations, the training internalizes the message that trafficking is 
perpetrated by foreign criminal organizations and is best solved 
through aggressive policing at the border.95  Framing trafficking as a 
90 For a compelling discussion of the inefficacy of these relatively low and infre-
quently imposed fines, see generally Michael J. Wishnie, Prohibiting the Employment of 
Unauthorized Immigrants:  The Experiment Fails, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 193. 
91 For a list of recently enacted state laws concerning trafficking, see note 164.  See 
also HEATHER J. CLAWSON ET AL., ICF INT’L, PROSECUTING HUMAN TRAFFICKING CASES:  
LESSONS LEARNED AND PROMISING PRACTICES 4 (2008), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/ 
pdffiles1/nij/grants/223972.pdf (noting that, at that time, thirty states and U.S. territo-
ries had enacted statutes for prosecuting human trafficking).  
92 Of the seventy-seven state officials surveyed by Clawson et al., only seven per-
cent—or about five officials—had prosecuted trafficking cases, although “some” men-
tioned referrals to federal officials.  Id. at 23-24.   
93 See, e.g., Jackson v. State, No. 103-0091, 2003 Minn. App. LEXIS 1316, at *10 
(Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 4, 2003) (affirming the conviction of a defendant under the pre-
TVPA provision of a statute prohibiting the promotion of prostitution of a minor); 
State v. Daugherty, 744 S.W.2d 849, 851-54 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (affirming the convic-
tion of a defendant for sex trafficking under a pre-TVPA provision criminalizing the 
purchase of a child for adoption); Buggs v. State, No. 05-07-00676, 2008 Tex. App. LEX-
IS 1499, at *15-17 (Tex. Ct. App. Feb. 29, 2008) (affirming convictions for trafficking in 
persons, aggravated kidnapping, and compelling prostitution in a case involving the 
long-running forced prostitution of a fourteen-year-old victim who met the defendant at 
a bus stop).  But see Ramos v. State, No. 13-06-00646, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 7837, at *2-
10 (Tex. Ct. App. Oct. 8, 2009) (affirming the conviction of a defendant under a state 
trafficking offense for using threats regarding immigration status to coerce two women 
from Mexico to work without compensation at an adult daycare center). 
94 See CLAWSON ET AL., supra note 91, at 23 (reporting that sixty-eight percent of 
prosecutors surveyed did not consider human trafficking to be a problem in their ju-
risdiction). 
95 See, e.g., The Rise of the Mexican Drug Cartels and U.S. National Security:  Hearing Before 
the H. Oversight & Government Reform Comm., 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Todd 
Owen, Acting Deputy Assistant Comm’r, Office of Field Operations, U.S. Customs and 
Border Protection, Department of Homeland Security), available at http://oversight. 
2010] Tensions and Trade-offs 1631 
crime perpetrated by foreigners both fits within and fuels a popular 
discourse in which the noncitizen is perceived as a criminal threat.96 
The image of trafficking as a foreign evil perpetrated by minorities 
and migrants has at least two collateral effects that actually complicate 
rather than complement antitrafficking efforts.  First, it fuels a prob-
lematic notion of the noncitizen as criminal threat, which in turn has 
policy implications that actually undercut trafficking protections.  
Second, this approach leaves the large demand for trafficked labor 
unaffected and unnamed.  Each of these issues is discussed in turn. 
First, this approach fuels exaggerated public perceptions of the 
noncitizen as a criminal or terrorist.97  It is quite efficient as a policy 
matter to focus on trafficking cases involving defendants who are gen-
erally unwelcome in the polity to begin with and who are unlikely to 
be able to mount effective defenses.  It is certainly easier than prose-
cuting companies with teams of lawyers or defendants who might 
garner more sympathy than the noncitizens they have exploited.  Un-
house.gov/images/stories/documents/20090708190119.pdf (describing antitrafficking 
efforts at the border and characterizing them as complementary to DHS’s “Secure 
Border Initiative”); Law Enforcement Responses to Mexican Drug Cartels:  Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Crime & Drugs of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Congress 3-4 (2009) 
(statement of Terry Goddard, Att’y Gen. of the State of Arizona) (discussing human 
trafficking as one of a number of problems that can be combated through interagency 
investigations, raids, and prosecutions in the border region); Randall Mikkelsen, Ob-
ama Mexico Border Plan Not Enough—U.S. Senator, REUTERS, Mar. 25, 2009, http:// 
www.reuters.com/article/idUSN25352630 (reporting Senator Joseph Lieberman’s 
complaint that the President’s border initiative was insufficient and that he would “try 
to quickly pass funding to hire 1,600 more Customs and Border Patrol agents and ex-
tra immigration officers, build up law enforcement centers and fight human traffick-
ing”); cf. 155 CONG. REC. H5258, H5258-60 (daily ed. May 6, 2009) (containing discus-
sion of H.R. Res. 14, 111th Cong. (2009), a resolution “recognizing the importance of 
the Border Patrol in combating human smuggling,” in which members frequently used 
“smuggling” and “trafficking” interchangeably—for example, Representative Cohen 
characterized trafficking as a form of smuggling—and asserted that border apprehen-
sions and prosecutions of “traffickers” are the key to ending trafficking).   
96 See infra note 98.  Several authors have also noted that the rise of white victims 
has been an important counterpoint to this racialized portrait of traffickers.  See, e.g., 
DAUVERGNE, supra note 27, at 74; Jacqueline Berman, (Un)Popular Strangers and Crises 
(Un)Bounded:  Discourses of Sex-Trafficking, the European Political Community and the Pa-
nicked State of the Modern State, 9 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 37, 60-62 (2003) (discussing political 
implications of the race and gender of victims); Kamala Kempadoo, The Migrant 
Tightrope:  Experiences from the Caribbean (discussing the relevance of race in the sex 
trade), in GLOBAL SEX WORKERS:  RIGHTS, RESISTANCE, AND REDEFINITION 124, 130-31 
(Kamala Kempadoo & Jo Doezema eds., 1998). 
97 See Chacón, supra note 4, at 1835-56 (discussing how noncitizens—particularly 
unauthorized migrants—have been constructed as criminal and national security 
threats).  For a discussion of the links drawn between antitrafficking and antiterrorism 
measures, see infra note 115 and accompanying text. 
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fortunately, presenting trafficking as a product of certain nefarious 
noncitizens reinforces problematic notions of the noncitizen as inhe-
rently more criminally inclined than her citizen counterparts.98  It also 
reinforces the flawed notion that the solution to the trafficking prob-
lem is simply to keep migrants out of the country. 
Moreover, as a matter of public messaging, such efforts actually 
hinder efforts to humanize and make a case for assisting victims of 
trafficking.  Traffickers are portrayed as perpetrators of a “special evil” 
akin to terrorism.99  This characterization makes it more difficult to 
conceive of ordinary citizens and corporations as perpetrators of traf-
ficking; trafficking is, in this account, a crime that outsiders who pose 
unique threats to public safety commit.100  Yet reliance on the trope of 
the dangerous noncitizen fuels policies that actually complicate anti-
trafficking efforts.  Citizen fears of migrants as criminals fuel a drive 
for more restrictionist immigration policies.101  Such policies can fru-
98 Numerous studies have pointed to the gap between public perception and ac-
tual data on this question.  See, e.g., Matthew T. Lee et al., Does Immigration Increase Ho-
micide?  Negative Evidence from Three Border Cities, 42 SOC. Q. 559, 560, 571-74 (2001) 
(concluding that there is no correlation between recent immigration and higher crime 
rates); Rubén G. Rumbaut et al., Debunking the Myth of Immigrant Criminality:  Imprison-
ment Among First- and Second-Generation Young Men, MIGRATION INFO. SOURCE, June 
2006, http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?id=403 (“In the ab-
sence of rigorous empirical research, myths and stereotypes about immigrants and 
crime often provide the underpinnings for public policies and practices . . . .”); Robert 
J. Sampson, Open Doors Don’t Invite Criminals, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2006, at A15 
(“[E]vidence points to increased immigration as a major factor associated with the 
lower crime rate of the 1990s . . . .”); Kristin F. Butcher & Anne Morrison Piehl, Recent 
Immigrants:  Unexpected Implications for Crime and Incarceration 4-11 (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6067, 1997) (suggesting reasons why immigrant 
institutionalization rates lag behind native institutionalization rates); see also Eyal Press, 
Do Immigrants Make Us Safer?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2006, at E20 (describing the existing 
scholarship addressing this topic). 
99 See, e.g., President George W. Bush, Statement to the United Nations General 
Assembly (Sept. 23, 2003), available at http://www.un.org/webcast/ga/58/statements/ 
usaeng030923.htm (addressing the “special evil” of trafficking in the context of re-
marks aimed at the threat of global terrorism). 
100 See, e.g., Pushing the Border Out on Alien Smuggling:  New Tools and Intelligence Initi-
atives:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Border Security and Claims of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 33 (2004) (statement of John P. Torres, Deputy As-
sistant Director, Smuggling and Public Safety, U.S. Immigration and Customs En-
forcement, Department of Homeland Security) [hereinafter Pushing the Border Out 
Hearing] (“[W]e recognize that human smuggling and trafficking into the United 
States constitute a significant risk to national security and public safety.”). 
101 For example, The Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR), an or-
ganization that “advocates a temporary moratorium on all immigration except spouses 
and minor children of U.S. citizens and a limited number of refugees,” FAIR:  About 
Comprehensive Immigration Reform, http://www.fairus.org/site/PageNavigator/about 
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strate the goal of protecting migrants who are victims of trafficking 
not only because they cast all migrants as undesirable but also because 
they feed the very policies that have helped to make trafficking possi-
ble and profitable.  Traffickers will continue to supply laborers to 
markets that cannot be satisfied through lawful channels.102 
Second, this focus can deflect attention from the demands that 
create a market for trafficking.  As the California legislature has re-
cently worked to acknowledge, trafficking does not occur in the ab-
sence of markets.103  Truly effective antitrafficking efforts need to 
identify which products and services trafficked workers provide and 
must involve strategies to curb demand for those products and servic-
es.  Curbing demand must include prosecution of those who profit 
from trafficking labor, even when those individuals and companies do 
not fit the convenient profile of the paradigmatic individual, nonciti-
zen trafficker.  Current antitrafficking enforcement discourse focuses 
almost exclusively on targeting supply networks, while deemphasizing 
the demand side of the equation in the market for trafficked per-
sons—whether for sex, cheaply produced goods, or agricultural labor.  
Criminal prosecutions aimed at the demand side of the trafficking 
problem are virtually nonexistent. 
Ultimately, punishing individuals who supply trafficked labor to 
the market is, without question, a worthwhile goal.  But efforts to pu-
nish traffickers should include systematic efforts to include punish-
ment that targets the demand side.  Currently, not only are the profit-
eers of trafficked human labor frequently underpunished, but the 
pattern of prosecutions that is actually highlighted in the promotional 
materials put forth by the Department of Justice and ICE helps to 
(follow “Our Purpose” hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 15, 2010), places “illegal immigra-
tion” and “crime” at the very top of the page of “immigration issues” covered, FAIR:  
Immigration Issue Center, http://www.fairus.org/site/PageNavigator/issues (last vi-
sited Apr. 15, 2010), and provides a list of crimes committed by noncitizens as an ar-
gument in favor of immigration restrictions, FAIR:  Examples of Serious Crimes of  
Illegal Aliens, http://www.fairus.org/site/PageServer?pagename=research_seriouscrime 
(last visited Apr. 15, 2010).  For a discussion of how the threat of migrant criminality was 
used as part of the campaign in favor of California’s Proposition 187, see Kevin R. John-
son, An Essay on Immigration Politics, Popular Democracy, and California’s Proposition 187:  
The Political Relevance and Legal Irrelevance of Race, 70 WASH. L. REV. 629, 654 (1995). 
102 See Neha Misra, The Push & Pull of Globalization:  How the Global Economy Makes 
Migrant Workers Vulnerable to Exploitation, HUM. RTS. BRIEF, Spring 2007, at 2, 2-3 (ar-
guing that where labor-market needs are unmet, “profit potential is much higher” for 
those employing trafficked workers than for those utilizing local labor). 
103 See, e.g., Everyone’s Business:  California’s Role in Combating Human Rights Violations 
in Product Supply Chains:  Joint Informational Hearing of the S. Comm. on Labor and Industri-
al Relations and the S. Comm. on Judiciary, 2009–2010 Leg. (Cal. 2009). 
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stoke misunderstandings of the nature of the trafficking problem.  
Framing the trafficking problem as one that is the sole responsibility 
of noncitizens and outsiders fits comfortably within the larger narra-
tive that has been constructed around unauthorized migration. 
This construction of the trafficking problem also indirectly justi-
fies another policy outcome that is actually disadvantageous to  
antitrafficking efforts:  the criminalization of the smuggled migrant.  
As previously noted, the successful passage of the TVPA depended on 
the creation of a clear legal distinction between criminals who violate 
the immigration law and victims of trafficking.104  To a certain extent, 
this is unavoidable, and it is not inherently catastrophic for the protec-
tion of migrants’ rights, provided that the resulting legal treatment of 
smuggled migrants comports with human rights norms.105  In drafting 
the Palermo Protocol, the human rights community was preoccupied 
with the desire to ensure that smuggled migrants were not unduly 
criminalized as a result.106 
Unfortunately, in the United States, the smuggled migrant has 
been subject to intense criminalization in recent years.107  Policymak-
ers have given the enforcement of immigration restrictions a very high 
priority, and in this equation, smuggled migrants are subject to ex-
104 See supra text accompanying notes 14-28.  For a refutation of the notion that 
there is a clear distinction between trafficking and smuggling, see, for example, BRID-
GET ANDERSON & JULIA O’CONNELL DAVIDSON, IS TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS DE-
MAND DRIVEN?  A MULTI-COUNTRY PILOT STUDY 9 (2003); Chacón, supra note 10, at 
3021-24; Gallagher, supra note 38, at 1000; Haynes, supra note 11, at 70. 
105 See Gallagher, supra note 1, at 790, 792 (noting the need for clear legal defini-
tions, while also noting that to a certain extent the distinction rests on a “strange legal 
fiction”). 
106 See id. at 790-91 (“Our focus . . . remained squarely on ensuring that drafters 
did not endorse criminalization of smuggled migrants . . . .”). 
107 See, e.g., Daniel Kanstroom, Criminalizing the Undocumented:  Ironic Boundaries of the 
Post-September 11th “Pale of Law,” 29 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 639, 640 (2004) (consi-
dering “convergence between the immigration and criminal justice systems”); Stephen 
H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law:  Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice 
Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469, 471-72 (2007) (“[I]mmigration law has been absorb-
ing the theories, methods, perceptions, and priorities of the criminal enforcement model 
while rejecting the criminal adjudication model in favor of a civil regulatory regime.”); 
Teresa A. Miller, Blurring the Boundaries Between Immigration and Crime Control After Septem-
ber 11th, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 81, 83-86 (2005) (describing consequences of the in-
teraction between criminal justice and immigration law); Teresa A. Miller, Citizenship & 
Severity:  Recent Immigration Reforms and the New Penology, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 611, 616-20 
(2003) (describing the use of the phrase “criminalization of immigration law”); Juliet 
Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis:  Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 
367, 376-77 (2006) (noting the rise of “crimmigration law”). 
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tremely harsh penalties under the criminal law,108  and to highly puni-
tive policies under civil immigration law.109 Treatment of migrants is 
thus increasingly dichotomous:  either a noncitizen qualifies as a traf-
ficking victim, in which case she can avail herself of human rights pro-
tections under the TVPA, or the noncitizen is a smuggled migrant, 
who is subject to detention, prosecution, criminal punishment, and 
removal.  If an individual falls in a gray area—between an outright vic-
tim of “severe” trafficking and a smuggled migrant who is subject to 
everyday forms of labor exploitation—the government’s approach has 
been to treat the gray-area case as one involving a voluntary migrant 
who is not eligible for the protections available to trafficking victims.110 
In some ways, the growing chasm between the treatment of traf-
ficked victims and all other unauthorized migrants further fuels poli-
cies that limit the official scope of trafficking prosecutions.  If a 
broader range of exploitative practices were highlighted, where ap-
propriate, and prosecuted by the government, two things would be-
come immediately clear.  The first is that mainstream companies and 
individuals benefit from trafficked labor, directly and indirectly.  An 
understanding of this complicity could lead to more rational discus-
sions regarding issues of labor and migration.  The second is that a 
broader range of victims would be entitled to protections than is cur-
rently the practice.  Providing more individuals with legal protections 
and benefits would have the advantage of undermining the exploita-
tive labor practices that have been allowed to thrive at the unpoliced 
intersection of labor law and immigration law.111  Instead, the “special” 
108 See, e.g., Chacón, supra note 5, at 135 & n.2 (citing authorities noting the trend 
in “increasingly harsh criminal consequences”). 
109 See, e.g., Legomsky, supra note 107, at 482-86 (summarizing consequences crim-
inal convictions have on immigration status). 
110 See generally Srikantiah, supra note 19, at 191-95 (exploring how the government 
envisions an “iconic victim” to distinguish between voluntary migrants and trafficking 
victims); Kathleen Kim, The Coercion of Trafficked Workers, 95 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 
2010) (manuscript at 32, on file with author) (noting that the Department of Justice 
tends to focus its efforts on cases involving direct physical force or restraint, and that 
few prosecuted cases involve other forms of coercion, despite the TVPA’s broad defini-
tion of the term).  This problem is compounded when courts apply the TVPA standard 
of coercion in an overly narrow fashion, thereby excluding a broad range of coerced 
conduct that the TVPA actually protects.  See Ivy Lee, Appellate Brief, An Appeal of a T Vi-
sa Denial, 14 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 455 (2007) (narrating the denial of a T Visa 
for a trafficking victim subject to nonphysical coercion); Kim, supra (manuscript at 31) 
(discussing courts’ overly narrow reading of “coercion” in post-TVPA trafficking cases). 
111 Recent developments in immigration law have undermined the protections of 
the labor law regime in cases involving unauthorized migrants, thereby ironically pro-
viding employers with even more monetary incentives to hire unauthorized workers.  
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nature of the harm of trafficking is highlighted and attributed to for-
eign forces.  This depiction in turn gives rise to further “evidence” in 
support of widespread misperceptions of migrant criminality,112 thus 
justifying the very border-control efforts that may, ironically, give traf-
fickers more business.113 
II.  ANTITRAFFICKING ENFORCEMENT AND THE  
CRIMINALIZATION OF MIGRATION 
The previous Part explored the ways in which current antitraffick-
ing strategies have the potential to fuel misperceptions concerning 
migrant criminality.  In turn, this discourse justifies restrictionist mi-
gration policies and laws that criminalize smuggled migrants.  This 
Part traces out the manifestations of the discourse on the ground.  In 
particular, this Part explores the ways in which antitrafficking efforts 
have been used to justify a prosecution-centered approach not only to 
antitrafficking efforts but to all immigration policy. 
See Catherine L. Fisk & Michael J. Wishnie, Hoffman Plastics Compounds, Inc. v. 
NLRB:  The Rules of the Workplace for Undocumented Immigrants (describing the tensions 
between immigration and labor law), in IMMIGRATION STORIES 311, 311-12 (David A. 
Martin & Peter H. Schuck eds., 2005); Ruben J. Garcia, Toward Fundamental Change for 
the Protection of Low-Wage Workers:  The “Workers’ Rights Are Human Rights” Debate in the 
Obama Era, 2009 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 421, 422-24 (arguing that the current labor law statu-
tory scheme is flawed because it divides workers into categories and is “changeable, 
malleable, and politically contingent”); Saucedo, supra note 13, at 893-903 (discussing 
how recent government activity reinforced immigrant community fears and forced un-
documented workers “deeper into the shadows”); Wishnie, supra note 90, at 195 
(“[T]he prohibition on [undocumented-immigrant] employment . . . in fact has led to 
increased workplace exploitation of undocumented immigrants, strengthened the 
‘jobs magnet’ that sanctions aimed to weaken, encouraged illegal immigration, and 
eroded wages and working conditions for U.S. workers.”). 
112 See Jennifer M. Chacón, Whose Community Shield?:  Examining the Removal of the 
“Criminal Street Gang Member,” 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 317, 348-49 (discussing ways in 
which migrants are perceived as criminals and how those perceptions increase support 
for harsh immigration laws).  For information on actual rates of migrant criminality, 
see Rumbaut et al., supra note 98, which finds that immigrants have lower rates of 
criminal convictions than native-born Americans.  
113 See Hathaway, supra note 1, at 34 (“Simply put, the agreement of states to cri-
minalize smuggling and to strengthen border control efforts, coupled with inelastic 
demand for border crossing by mostly less-than-wealthy persons, will logically create 
the conditions within which traditionally benign forms of smuggling are transmuted 
into the clearly rights-abusive practices characteristic of trafficking.”); see also Pushing 
the Border Out Hearing, supra note 100, at 40 (statement of John P. Torres) (explaining 
that ICE’s antitrafficking strategy is to “dismantle the criminal and terrorist organiza-
tions that smuggle or traffic in people” and to apply “a vast array of investigative metho-
dologies in the fight against both criminal and terrorist organizations as well as the in-
frastructure that supports their activities in the United States and around the world”). 
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An immigration strategy that relies heavily on the criminalization 
of migrants undercuts antitrafficking goals.  Section II.A explores the 
complex interaction between the increased border enforcement that 
has been justified in part on antitrafficking grounds and the actual ef-
fects of these policies on trafficking.  Section II.B explores state and 
local participation in antitrafficking efforts and explains that while 
these efforts can bolster federal efforts, they also map onto certain re-
strictionist polices that are in tension with antitrafficking goals.  For 
this reason, the development of state antitrafficking strategies, like any 
other antitrafficking effort situated in a broader context of highly re-
strictionist enforcement efforts, may actually prove to be a mixed 
blessing for migrant trafficking victims. 
A.  Border Control Policy as Antitrafficking Policy 
One of the most consistent themes sounded over the past decade 
by government officials charged with “homeland security” has been 
the need to increase “border security.”  Although the term was almost 
never used prior to 2001, “border security” has become a catchphrase 
that encompasses a range of security-related goals, including immigra-
tion control, customs screening of goods and people, and more exact-
ing (usually biometric) document requirements.114 
Government officials frequently have mentioned antitrafficking 
efforts within the context of border security.115  Antitrafficking is gen-
erally listed as one of a number of objectives that officials hope to 
achieve through an increased law enforcement presence at the bor-
der.  In this sense, trafficking in persons, like drug trafficking or hu-
man smuggling, is presented as a problem that exists largely because 
of insufficient personnel and monitoring along the border. 
It is certainly true that some international trafficking occurs like 
other forms of unauthorized migration:  individuals lacking legal au-
thorization to enter the country are transported across the border sur-
reptitiously or using fraudulent documents.  To a certain extent, a 
greater (and better trained) force along the border could stop some 
trafficking at the international border. 
On the other hand, much of the human trafficking that occurs in 
the contemporary context could easily avert even the most stringently 
staffed borders.  Some victims have legitimate visas that allow them 
114 See Chacón, supra note 4, at 1853-54 (discussing post–September 11 use of the 
phrase “border security”). 
115 See, e.g., sources cited supra note 95. 
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entry.116  Others have facially valid but fraudulent visas that have been 
obtained for them by traffickers.117  Thus, for some migrants, it is only 
after they have entered the country that the person responsible for 
their transportation or their later employment is able to exploit vulne-
rabilities in their legal and economic status, and the relationship 
changes to one of trafficking victim and trafficker.118 
This is significant because solutions to the trafficking problem de-
pend on correctly identifying the nature of that problem.  To date, 
government officials charged with eradicating trafficking have made a 
number of statements suggesting that they understand the trafficking 
problem as best solved by attacking criminal smuggling networks.  For 
example, in his remarks at a human trafficking symposium in the fall 
of 2008, then–Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security Mi-
chael Chertoff stated, 
Let me be clear about this:  the line between so-called voluntary migra-
tion and human trafficking is not a very bold line.  It is often the case 
that people who begin the movement across borders in a voluntary way, 
because they want to come across in order to get work for themselves, 
quickly turn into victims when they are held for ransom, or when they 
are required to work off the cost of the smuggling by paying off the vast 
majority of their wages to smuggling organizations.  Therefore, by crack-
ing down on illegal migration, we are actually cracking down on the kind 
of network activity, which actually facilitates human trafficking and vic-
timization, as well.
119
 
Much of this statement is incontrovertible.  First, Mr. Chertoff correct-
ly acknowledges that there is no bright line that separates smuggling 
116 This is the situation of the plaintiffs in the case against Signal International, 
who held valid H-2B visas but thought that they would be provided with permanent 
visas and allegedly were exploited by the employer who made those promises.  See Julia 
Preston, Suit Points to Guest Worker Program Flaws, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2010, at A12.  Inte-
restingly, the plaintiffs in the Signal International case also allege that “[i]mmigration 
authorities worked closely with [the] company . . . to discourage protests by temporary 
guest workers from India over their job conditions, including advising managers to 
send some workers back to India.”  Id. 
117 See LIANA SUN WYLER, ALISON SISKIN & CLARE RIBANDO SEELKE, CONG. RES. 
SERV., TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS:  U.S. POLICY AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 5 (2009) (ex-
plaining how traffickers use false documents to transport women lured by false prom-
ises of jobs, study, or travel opportunities). 
118 See id. (“After providing transportation and false documents to get victims to 
their destination, [traffickers] subsequently charge exorbitant fees for those services, 
often creating life-time debt bondage.”).  
119 Michael Chertoff, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Remarks at the Stop Human 
Trafficking Symposium (Sept. 9, 2008), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/ 
speeches/sp_1221053062406.shtm. 
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from trafficking.  Instead, situations involving smuggled migrants are 
fluid and can change to trafficking over time, depending on circums-
tances.  Second, his remarks pinpoint the fact that unauthorized or 
smuggled migrants suffer from legal and economic vulnerabilities that 
render them susceptible to trafficking.  Third, he notes that some of 
the players involved in smuggling migrants are also involved in traffick-
ing—a statement that is undoubtedly true in some cases, although Mr. 
Chertoff makes no effort to make a precise statement as to the degree 
of overlap.  He merely notes that these individuals use the same “kind 
of network activity.”  Finally, he states that the large debts that migrants 
frequently accrue to their smugglers put smuggling networks in a posi-
tion to exploit smuggled migrants through debt bondage.  Unfortu-
nately, while the statement recognizes the nuanced nature of the traf-
ficking problem, the proposed solution is not equally nuanced.  In the 
end, the Secretary proposes “cracking down on illegal migration.”120 
Efforts to “crack down on illegal migration” have been on a rapid 
rise since the mid-1990s.  Over the past six years—and on the watch of 
administrations from two different political parties—immigration en-
forcement has ballooned.121  Government spending on border en-
forcement and interior enforcement is at its highest level in history.  
The number of individuals formally removed each year reached a 
record high in 2009, and the current Administration is on course to 
set yet another record this year.122 
The government is also prosecuting more immigration offenses 
than ever before.123  Indeed, immigration crimes now make up half of 
the federal criminal docket124—the vast majority of these offenses are 
unlawful entry and, to a lesser extent, felony reentry.125  Smuggling 
120 Id. 
121 See Jennifer M. Chacón, A Diversion of Attention?:  Immigration Courts and the Ad-
judication of Fourth and Fifth Amendment Rights, 59 DUKE L.J. 1563, 1565-66 (2010) 
(“Never before in the history of the United States has the government removed so 
many noncitizens in so short a time frame.”). 
122 Id. 
123 See Chacón, supra note 5, at 139 (“After remaining relatively flat in the period 
from 1986 to 1996, the number of immigration prosecutions almost quadrupled over 
the next ten years.”). 
124 See Schwartz, supra note 7 (reporting a nearly nine-percent increase in federal 
immigration prosecutions in fiscal year 2009 from previous years); see also TRANSAC-
TIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE, FY 2009 FEDERAL PROSECUTIONS SHARPLY 
HIGHER (2009), http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/crim/223 (indicating that, in fiscal 
year 2009, immigration prosecutions comprised fifty-four percent of all federal filings). 
125 TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE, IMMIGRATION PROSECU-
TIONS AT RECORD LEVELS IN FY 2009 (2009), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/ 
1640 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 158: 1609 
and trafficking prosecutions are a miniscule subset of total prosecu-
tions.126  Trafficking offenses do not even make the list of the top ten 
categories of immigration prosecutions.127 
If “cracking down on illegal migration” truly reduces trafficking, 
as Secretary Chertoff’s remarks suggest,128 then the increase in remov-
als and prosecutions discussed above would be an effective means of 
reducing trafficking.  For a variety of reasons, however, it is unlikely 
that such a direct line between immigration enforcement and traffick-
ing eradication exists. 
Indeed, in some ways, the efforts to “crack down on illegal migra-
tion” might actually facilitate trafficking.  First, efforts to crack down 
on illegal migration in the workplace have left undocumented mi-
grants more—not less—vulnerable to exploitation.129  Second, efforts 
to prosecute large numbers of first-time illegal entrants have over-
whelmed resources along the southern border, diverting law en-
forcement resources from more serious crimes—including traffick-
ing—in favor of securing thousands of easy plea convictions.130 
Third, because increased border enforcement has not stopped the 
flow of unauthorized migration but has simply made it more difficult 
and more costly, these efforts have exacerbated the dynamic, identi-
fied by Secretary Chertoff in his speech,131 whereby smugglers exploit 
the migrants who have made contractual arrangements with them.  
One thing that seems clear about recent border-enforcement efforts is 
that they have made cross-border movement more difficult, and con-
sequently, more costly.132  Presumably, people are more likely to turn 
reports/218 (providing a summary of data on immigration prosecutions from the first 
nine months of fiscal year 2009). 
126 Id. 
127 Id. 
128 Chertoff, supra note 119. 
129 See, e.g., Saucedo, supra note 13, at 892 (providing an overview of the U visa and 
its implications for undocumented workers); see also Chacón, supra note 10, at 2980 
(suggesting that the TVPA’s exclusion of a broad range of labor exploitation from its 
reach exacerbates workplace exploitation). 
130 See, e.g., JOANNA LYDGATE, THE CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN INST. ON RACE, 
ETHNICITY & DIVERSITY, ASSEMBLY-LINE JUSTICE:  A REVIEW OF OPERATION STREAMLINE 
1-3 (2010), http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Operation_Streamline_Policy_Brief.pdf 
(analyzing the effectiveness of Operation Streamline, a program that “requires the 
federal criminal prosecution and imprisonment of all unlawful border crossers,” as a 
border-security measure). 
131 Chertoff, supra note 119. 
132 See Andreas, supra note 4, at 116 (noting that the increased risks of crossing the 
border have led to a rise in the price of being smuggled); Khalid Koser, Why Migrant 
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to professionals—smugglers—to assist them in crossing the border.133  
Smuggled migrants are now more likely to owe money to their smug-
glers and more likely to try to pay off this debt with labor after entry.134  
This increases the chances that smuggling relationships will transform 
into trafficking relationships.135  And once an individual is in a situa-
tion in which her labor is exploited, her legal vulnerability is exacer-
bated by contemporary policies that criminalize migrants. 
If such individuals could be comfortable knowing that they would 
be identified as trafficking victims and offered legal and social protec-
tion, such exploitation would not persist.  But these individuals fall 
within a gray area in which they are more likely to be identified as “il-
legal aliens” than “trafficking victims.”  Given the current “crackdown” 
on “illegal immigrants,” it is not at all surprising that such individuals 
would be very much afraid to seek official or unofficial assistance.136  
In short, although the Secretary may be right that smugglers and traf-
fickers rely on the same networks, it does not necessarily follow that 
“cracking down” on unauthorized migrants is the best way to combat 
the trafficking problem. 
Genuine efforts to address trafficking should focus at least as 
much attention on workplace conditions as on smuggling networks, 
Smuggling Pays, INT’L MIGRATION, June 2008, at 3 (providing data on the financing of 
smuggling in Afghanistan and Pakistan). 
133 See David Kyle & Rey Koslowski, Introduction to GLOBAL HUMAN SMUGGLING, supra 
note 4, at 1, 22; Raimo Väyrynen, Illegal Immigration, Human Trafficking, and Organized 
Crime 2-7, 20 (World Inst. for Dev. Econ. Research, Discussion Paper No. 2003/72, 2003), 
available at http://www.wider.unu.edu/publications/working-papers/discussion-papers/ 
2003/en_GB/dp2003-072/files/78091733799863273/default/dp2003-072.pdf (“To be 
able to cross the border, illegal immigrants may need the help of professional smug-
glers and their assistants.”).  Hathaway laments the lack of good data on this point.  See 
Hathaway, supra note 1, at 32 n.187 (“There is, however, a paucity of hard data to show 
a clear correlation between heightened border controls and increased human smug-
gling and/or trafficking.”). 
134 See, e.g., Guido Friebel & Sergei Guriev, Smuggling Humans:  A Theory of Debt-
Financed Migration, 4 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 1085, 1107-08 (2006) (noting that increased 
border protection leads to increased debt-financed migration, even where overall un-
authorized migration decreases). 
135 See Jacqueline Bhabha, Lone Travelers:  Rights, Criminalization, and the Transna-
tional Migration of Unaccompanied Children, 7 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 269, 285 
(2000) (noting that trafficked persons consent to migration with little knowledge of 
the potential coercive post-migration situation); David A. Feingold, Human Trafficking, 
FOREIGN POL’Y, Sept.–Oct. 2005, at 26, 27 (arguing that some measures designed to 
protect women might make them more vulnerable to traffickers); Hathaway, supra 
note 1, at 33-34 (“[D]esperate people determined to migrate will need smugglers more 
than ever.”). 
136 For a discussion of the ways in which government enforcement efforts fuel mi-
grant fear, see Saucedo, supra note 13, and supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
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and should target the employers of unauthorized workers more heavi-
ly than it targets the workers.  That has not been the nature of the 
U.S. crackdown on unauthorized migration.  Workplace raids have led 
to the massive removal of workers in many more cases than they have 
resulted in the prosecution of those who exploit migrant laborers.137  
As such, it seems just as likely that the crackdown will fuel some traf-
ficking even as it eradicates certain instances of it through the target-
ing and prosecution of some smuggling networks. 
If the relationship between immigration enforcement and anti-
trafficking efforts is so complex, why is the former so often cited as a 
direct means to the latter?  Certainly, there is an appealing superficial 
logic to the claims.  Furthermore, the ability to invoke the plight of 
the unfortunate trafficking victim to justify immigration enforcement 
puts a human face on both sides of an equation that otherwise seems 
to pit the economically disadvantaged migrant against the large and 
unsympathetic state.  The invocation of trafficking as a driving force 
behind immigration enforcement puts a human rights gloss on a bor-
der-enforcement model that, in fact, raises a number of serious hu-
man rights concerns.138  It is the very weakening of the human rights 
orientation of migration policy—such as the erosion of refugee pro-
tections—that increases the market for international trafficking.  But 
these connections are elided by policy statements that emphasize an 
equation where more enforcement means less trafficking. 
137 See Saucedo, supra note 13, at 896-98 (describing the effect of ICE raids on 
workplaces); see also Wishnie, supra note 90, at 195 (arguing that the “employer sanc-
tions regime” has resulted in increased exploitation of immigrant workers); Spencer S. 
Hsu, For the Record:  Immigration, WASH. POST, Jan. 29, 2008, at A13 (“While federal im-
migration authorities arrested nearly four times as many people at workplaces in 2007 
as they did in 2005[,] . . . [o]nly 92 owners, supervisors or hiring officials were arrested 
in an economy that includes 6 million companies that employ more than 7 million un-
authorized workers.”), in William Branigin, Sebelius Conciliatory in Democrats’ Response to 
Bush Address, WASH. POST, Jan. 29, 2008, at A13.  The large Agriprocessors, Inc. raid is 
a case in point.  Although about 300 noncitizens were arrested and removed in those 
raids, the owner of the plant ultimately did not face prosecution on any immigration-
related charges.  See Iowa:  Immigration Charges Dropped in Raid Case, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 
2009, at A20. 
138 See KEVIN R. JOHNSON, OPENING THE FLOODGATES:  WHY AMERICA NEEDS TO 
RETHINK ITS BORDERS AND IMMIGRATION LAWS 87-130 (2007) (detailing the undesira-
ble and immoral consequences of restrictive immigration policy); see also Bill Ong 
Hing, Immigration Policy:  Thinking Outside the (Big) Box, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1401, 1440 
(2007) (noting the “brutality inherent in enforcement of the current immigration con-
trols, which result in physical abuse, promote racial discrimination, and relegate cer-
tain groups of U.S. citizens and lawful immigrants to second-class status,” as well as the 
“[r]ampant civil rights deprivations [that] have resulted,” and concluding that “[s]uch 
consequences render U.S. immigration enforcement immoral”). 
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Interestingly, the same sort of pattern appears at the state level, 
where some state legislatures have enacted antitrafficking legislation 
not as part of a trend toward greater human rights protections for mi-
grants but rather as part of a trend toward more state participation in 
the regulation and criminalization of unauthorized migration. 
B.  State and Local Immigration Enforcement Through  
Antitrafficking Policy? 
State and local participation in immigration regulation and en-
forcement has been constrained by Supreme Court doctrine, dating 
from the late nineteenth century,139 which declared that immigration 
control is a responsibility exclusively held by the federal govern-
ment.140  Courts have frequently struck down state efforts to regulate 
immigration law141 and have subjected states’ efforts to distinguish 
among state residents on the basis of alienage to heightened scruti-
ny,142 as opposed to the rational basis review applied to federal alie-
nage distinctions.143  Nevertheless, states’ efforts to develop immigra-
tion regulations have sometimes withstood court scrutiny in cases 
where courts have found that a state’s efforts to regulate immigration 
complement the federal statutory scheme.144 
139 Until the late nineteenth century, the states played a relatively active role in 
shaping and enforcing migration policy.  See GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE 
CONSTITUTION:  IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 23 (1996) (discussing 
state policies of banishment and conditional pardons as precursors of the federal depor-
tation mechanism); ARISTIDE R. ZOLBERG, A NATION BY DESIGN:  IMMIGRATION POLICY 
IN THE FASHIONING OF AMERICA 2-3 (2006) (arguing that the United States had an active 
immigration policy prior to the nineteenth century but that it was shaped by the states). 
140 See De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354 (1976) (“Power to regulate immigration 
is unquestionably exclusively a federal power.”). 
141 See, e.g., Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 554-55 (M.D. Pa. 
2007) (striking down as unconstitutional a set of ordinances passed in the city of Haz-
leton, Pennsylvania, to restrict benefits and services available to noncitizens); League 
of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755, 786-87 (C.D. Cal. 1995) 
(striking down much of Proposition 187, an initiative passed by California voters in 
1994, which sought to restrict benefits available to noncitizens). 
142 See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971) (holding that state statutes 
denying welfare benefits to residents violate the Equal Protection Clause); Takahashi v. 
Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410, 419 (1948) (“State laws which impose discrimina-
tory burdens upon the entrance or residence of aliens lawfully within the United 
States . . . have accordingly been held invalid.”). 
143 See Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 69 (1976) (upholding federal legislation 
conditioning an alien’s Medicare participation on her length of residency). 
144 See, e.g., De Canas, 424 U.S. at 357-58 (declining to invalidate a California Labor 
Code provision prohibiting employers from knowingly employing an unauthorized 
noncitizen worker where the provision was consistent with the comprehensive federal 
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Recently, state and local governments have developed a cottage 
industry in direct and indirect immigration law enforcement.  Over 
the past five years, state and local initiatives aimed at regulating immi-
gration have proliferated throughout the United States.145  These initi-
atives have included, among other things, criminal and civil penalties 
and contracting prohibitions upon employers who employ unautho-
rized migrant workers;146 penalties upon landlords who rent housing 
statutory scheme for regulation of immigration and naturalization).  More recently, the 
Ninth Circuit upheld an Arizona immigration law targeting the employment of unautho-
rized noncitizen workers.  See Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, 558 F.3d 856, 
866-67 (9th Cir. 2009) (upholding an Arizona statute that required employers to use the 
federal government’s electronic verification system for checking employees’ work autho-
rization status, even though the federal law makes use of the system voluntary). 
145 See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, IMMIGRANT POL’Y PROJECT, 
STATE LAWS RELATED TO IMMIGRANTS AND IMMIGRATION IN 2008, at 1 (2009), available 
at http://www.ncsl.org/portals/1/documents/immig/stateImmigReportFinal2008.pdf 
(noting that, in 2008, state legislatures considered at least 1305 immigration-related 
laws); Ken Belson & Jill P. Capuzzo, Towns Rethink Laws Against Illegal Immigrants, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 26, 2007, at A1 (“[M]ore than 30 towns nationwide have enacted laws in-
tended to address problems attributed to illegal immigration . . . .”).  Scholarly discus-
sions of these laws have abounded in recent years.  See, e.g., Karla Mari McKanders, The 
Constitutionality of State and Local Laws Targeting Immigrants, 31 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. 
REV. 579, 580-81 (2009) (describing Arkansas’s anti-immigration laws as a “microcosm 
of the various states across the country where state and local officials are coping with 
the recent expansion of legal and unauthorized immigration”); Michael A. Olivas, Im-
migration-Related State and Local Ordinances:  Preemption, Prejudice, and the Proper Role for 
Enforcement, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 27, 31 (noting the “torrent of state legislation” re-
lated to immigration); Huyen Pham, When Immigration Borders Move, 61 FLA. L. REV. 
1115, 1118-19 (2009) (discussing increased state involvement in immigration laws); 
Cristina M. Rodríguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH. 
L. REV. 567, 569 (2008) (noting the “regulatory trend[]” of increased state participa-
tion in immigration lawmaking); Juliet P. Stumpf, States of Confusion:  The Rise of State 
and Local Power over Immigration, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1557, 1559-60 (2008) (recognizing a 
“veritable deluge” of new state and local immigration laws); Rick Su, A Localist Reading 
of Local Immigration Regulations, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1619, 1622 (2008) (discussing the in-
creased interest of local governments in immigration laws). 
146 See, e.g., Legal Arizona Workers Act § 6, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-214 (Supp. 
2008) (mandating employer participation in the federal E-Verify program); ARK. CODE 
ANN. § 19-11-105(b) (2007) (“No state agency may enter into or renew a public con-
tract for services with a contractor who knows that the contractor or a subcontractor 
employs or contracts with an illegal immigrant to perform work under the contract.”); 
Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-18 (Sept. 8, 2006) (prohibiting businesses from hiring 
unauthorized migrants), invalidated by Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477; Bruce Lambert, 
Congressman Endorses Suffolk County Plan to Bar Contractors from Using Illegal Immigrants, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2006, at B3 (describing a Suffolk County, New York, bill to impose 
restrictions on county contractors).  The Suffolk County bill was passed into law in Oc-
tober.  See Hauppauge:  New Immigration Law, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2006, at B7 (reporting 
that the Suffolk County executive signed the bill into law). 
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to unauthorized migrants;147 English-only ordinances;148 and efforts to 
strip unauthorized migrants of public benefits.149  Many states have al-
so enacted criminal laws that mirror the federal government’s own 
prohibitions on immigration-related crimes such as harboring unau-
thorized migrants, using false proof of citizenship, and trafficking.150  
Some municipalities have even adopted their own policies targeting 
the undocumented, such as the Waukegan, Illinois, policy of automat-
ically impounding cars that belong to undocumented noncitizens.151  
One significant subset of these ordinances criminalizes conduct that 
state and local legislators associated—whether correctly or incorrect-
ly—with unauthorized migration.  Such ordinances include the laws 
that prohibit congregating in certain areas and soliciting employ-
147 See, e.g., Escondido, Cal., Ordinance 2006-38R (Oct. 18, 2006) (subjecting lan-
dlords that rent to unauthorized migrants to fines and imprisonment), permanently en-
joined by Garrett v. City of Escondido, No. 06-2434 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2006); Hazleton, 
Pa., Ordinance 2006-13 (Aug. 15, 2006) (requiring tenants to show proof of legal citi-
zenship or residency to obtain the occupancy permits necessary for landlords to avoid 
criminal prosecution).  For the basis upon which the Escondido ordinance was origi-
nally enjoined, see Garrett v. City of Escondido, 465 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1055-56, 1059 (S.D. 
Cal. 2006), in which the court granted a temporary restraining order against the or-
dinance based, in part, on the likelihood of preemption by the “harboring” provisions 
of 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (2006). 
148 See Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-19 (Sept. 8, 2006) (declaring that English is 
the official language of Hazleton), invalidated by Lozano, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477; see also 
Pham, supra note 145, at 1148 (noting that laws aimed at restricting the rights and 
benefits of noncitizens are “[o]ften . . . passed together with English-only ordinances”); 
cf. Keith Aoki et al., (In)visible Cities:  Three Local Government Models and Immigration Regu-
lation, 10 OR. REV. INT’L L. 453, 518-19 (2008) (observing the anti-Latino bias of Eng-
lish-only legislation); Richard Delgado, The Law of the Noose:  A History of Latino Lynch-
ing, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 297, 307-11 (2009) (noting the recent wave of English-
only ordinances and discussing linkages between English-only laws promoting racial 
oppression and racial violence against Latinos). 
149 See Michael A. Olivas, Lawmakers Gone Wild?  College Residency and the Response to 
Professor Kobach, 61 SMU L. REV. 99, 101-03 (2008) (discussing state laws and policies 
that deny undocumented students in-state tuition rates at public universities).  Efforts 
to deny public benefits to noncitizens have a rich history, which is neatly embodied in 
the 1990s struggle over California’s Proposition 187.  See Kevin R. Johnson, Open Bor-
ders?, 51 UCLA L. REV. 193, 238 (2003). 
150 See Olivas, supra note 149, at 101-02 (discussing laws in Georgia, Arizona, and 
Hazleton, Pennsylvania); Stumpf, supra note 145, at 1598-99 (discussing examples from 
Oklahoma, California, Oregon, and Wyoming).  See infra note 164 for a list of state  
antitrafficking legislation.  
151 See Catharine Slack, Municipal Targeting of Undocumented Immigrants’ Travel in the 
Post 9/11 Suburbs:  Waukegan, Illinois Case Study, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 485, 488-91 (2008) 
(describing Waukegan’s ordinance requiring that undocumented immigrants’ cars be 
towed). 
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ment.152  These laws take aim at “day laborers” and rest on the prob-
lematic assumption that all day laborers are unauthorized workers.153 
Scholars have split on the question of the constitutionality,154 not 
to mention the desirability,155 of state and local immigration regula-
tion.  Courts also have reached divergent conclusions on the constitu-
tionality of such state and local immigration-related ordinances.  
Some courts have concluded that these ordinances impermissibly en-
croach upon the field of immigration, which is to be occupied solely 
by the federal government.156  Other courts have struck down certain 
ordinances on the more limited grounds that they are inconsistent 
152 See, e.g., Victor Narro, Impacting Next Wave Organizing:  Creative Campaign Strategies 
of the Los Angeles Worker Centers, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 465, 490-95 (2005–2006) (discuss-
ing such ordinances in Redondo Beach and Los Angeles); Press Release, Mexican Am. 
Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, MALDEF, ACLU/SC and NDLON File Lawsuit Challenging 
City of Costa Mesa’s Anti-Solicitation Ordinance (Feb. 2, 2010), available at http:// 
maldef.org/news/releases/maldef_aclusc_and_ndlon_file_02022010 (discussing lawsuit 
against antisolicitation ordinance aimed at day laborers, among others); see also Cent. 
Am. Refugee Ctr. v. City of Glen Cove, 753 F. Supp. 437, 439-42 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) 
(upholding against equal protection and First Amendment challenges local antisolici-
tation ordinances that prevented day laborers from congregating). 
153 See Robin Finn, Town Divides over Law Aimed at Day Laborers, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 
2009, at NJ1 (describing a day-laborer law in Oyster Bay, New York); see also Lopez v. 
Town of Cave Creek, Ariz., 559 F. Supp. 2d 1030, 1035-36 (D. Ariz. 2008) (granting a 
preliminary injunction against a Cave Creek ordinance aimed at day-laborer solicita-
tion); Order Denying Motion to Suppress and Motion to Terminate Removal Proceed-
ings, In re Sanchez, File No. 98-300-503, at 6 (Dep’t of Justice Immig. Ct. Jan. 31, 2008) 
(“[T]he solicitation of day labor in our current culture has a strong correlation to un-
documented presence in the United States and lack of employment authorization.”). 
154 Compare Clare Huntington, The Constitutional Dimension of Immigration Federalism, 
61 VAND. L. REV. 787, 792 (2008) (challenging the traditional belief that there is a 
“constitutional mandate for federal exclusivity over pure immigration law”), with 
Huyen Pham, The Inherent Flaws in the Inherent Authority Position:  Why Inviting Local En-
forcement of Immigration Laws Violates the Constitution, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 965, 987 
(2004) (stating that the Framers intended for power over immigration to be “exclusive-
ly federal”), and Michael J. Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotry?  Devolution of the Immigration 
Power, Equal Protection, and Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493, 530-58 (2001) 
(“[I]mmigration power is an exclusively federal power which Congress may not, by sta-
tute, devolve to the states.”). 
155 Compare Kris W. Kobach, The Quintessential Force Multiplier:  The Inherent Authority 
of Local Police to Make Immigration Arrests, 69 ALB. L. REV. 179, 181 (2005) (contending 
that assistance from local police can lead to successful immigration law enforcement), 
and Rodríguez, supra note 145, at 593-94 (discussing why local communities think pass-
ing local immigration laws is beneficial), with Pham, supra note 154, at 981-86 (describ-
ing problems that arise from local involvement in immigration laws), and Wishnie, su-
pra note 154, at 567 (noting the “desirability of preserving the vitality of the equality 
norms that have for over a century shielded noncitizens from state and local bigotry”). 
156 See, e.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755, 786-
87 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (holding that the sections of Proposition 187 that occupied the 
immigration field controlled by federal law are preempted). 
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with existing federal statutes regulating immigration.157  Still other 
courts have upheld state and local ordinances, finding these schemes 
in harmony with federal efforts to regulate immigration.158  Where 
criminal law is concerned, because states and localities—rather than 
the federal government—have historically served as the locus of crim-
inal regulation,159 federal courts have sometimes been surprisingly will-
ing to defer to such local regulation of crime.160 
State and local ordinances aimed at managing migration raise im-
portant concerns about the rights of immigrant communities.  These 
ordinances put state and local law enforcement agents in the business 
of policing immigration as part of their core mission.161  Because re-
moval is often a possible sanction for noncitizens arrested in the 
course of enforcing these laws, the procedural gap between the rights 
and remedies available to noncitizens in civil (as opposed to criminal) 
immigration proceedings may create a situation in which local law en-
forcement agents funnel noncitizens into the civil removal system to 
avoid possible sanctions—such as suppression or disciplinary actions—
that might result if the same matter is brought in criminal courts.162  
More aggressive policing of immigrant communities may result.163 
Over the past six years, almost every state has enacted antitraffick-
ing legislation.164  This flurry of state legislation is, in part, a reflection 
157 See, e.g., Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 577 F. Supp. 2d 
858, 879 (N.D. Tex. 2008) (“Because Farmers Branch has attempted to regulate immi-
gration differently from the federal government, the Ordinance is preempted by the 
Supremacy Clause.”); Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 554-55 (M.D. 
Pa. 2007) (concluding that Hazleton may not “disrupt a carefully drawn federal statu-
tory scheme”). 
158 See, e.g., Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, 558 F.3d 856, 866-67 (9th 
Cir. 2009) (holding that Arizona’s E-Verify requirement for employers was not 
preempted because it accorded with congressional intent). 
159 See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 
261 (1993) (“Before the twentieth century, criminal justice was overwhelmingly the 
business of the states, not the federal government.”). 
160 See Stumpf, supra note 145, at 1587, 1608 (noting the phenomenon and ar-
guing that such deference is undesirable when the goal of the criminal statute is to en-
force immigration law indirectly). 
161 See Chacón, supra note 121, at 1579-92. 
162 See id. at 1598-1615. 
163 See id. at 1615-19. 
164 As of August 2009, forty-three states had enacted criminal and civil laws target-
ing human trafficking.  Melynda H. Barnhart, Sex and Slavery:  An Analysis of Three Mod-
els of State Human Trafficking Legislation, 16 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 83, 87 (2009); 
see also ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.360 (2008) (enacted 2006) (criminalizing sex and labor 
trafficking); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1307 (Supp. 2008) (enacted 2005) (criminaliz-
ing sex trafficking); id. § 13-1308 (enacted 2005) (criminalizing labor trafficking); ARK. 
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CODE ANN. § 5-11-108 (2006) (enacted 2005) (criminalizing trafficking); CAL. CIV. 
CODE § 52.5 (West 2008) (creating a private right of action for human trafficking vic-
tims); CAL. PENAL CODE § 236.1 (West 2008 & Supp. 2009) (criminalizing trafficking); 
id. § 236.2 (providing additional protection for trafficking victims); id. § 236.5 (de-
scribing law enforcement obligations to identify victims of human trafficking); id. 
§ 266k (providing programming for child victims); id. § 273.7 (penalizing disclosure of 
the location of a trafficking shelter); id. § 293 (forbidding law enforcement agents 
from disclosing the personal information of trafficking victims); COLO. REV. STAT. 
§ 18-6-402 (2008) (enacted 1977) (criminalizing child trafficking); id. § 18-13-127 
(enacted 2006) (criminalizing trafficking in adults); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-571i 
(West 2007 & Supp. 2009) (enacted 2006) (creating a civil private cause of action); id. 
§ 53a-192a (enacted 2006) (criminalizing trafficking); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 787 
(2007) (enacted 2007) (criminalizing trafficking); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 772.104 (West 
2007) (creating a private right of action for trafficking victims); id. § 787.05 (West 
2007) (enacted 2004) (criminalizing forced labor); id. § 787.06 (finding human traf-
ficking to be a “modern day” form of slavery); id. § 16-5-46 (enacted 2006) (criminaliz-
ing trafficking); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-8602 (Supp. 2008) (enacted 2006) (defining 
human trafficking); id. § 18-8603 (criminalizing human trafficking); 720 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. 5/10-9 (2010) (enacted 2009) (criminalizing trafficking); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-
42-3.5-1 (West Supp. 2008) (enacted 2006) (criminalizing trafficking); id. § 35-42-3.5-2 
(enacted 2006) (providing that a court may order that restitution be paid to a victim of 
trafficking); id. § 35-42-3.5-3 (enacted 2006) (creating a civil private right of action); 
IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 710A.1–.5 (West Supp. 2009) (enacted 2006) (defining trafficking 
and providing restitution for victims and an affirmative defense for alleged perpetra-
tors); id. § 915.51 (enacted 2006) (providing protection of victims regardless of immi-
gration status); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3446 (2007) (enacted 2005) (criminalizing traf-
ficking); id. § 21-3447 (enacted 2005) (criminalizing aggravated trafficking); KY. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 529.100 (LexisNexis 2008) (enacted 2007) (criminalizing trafficking); id. 
§ 529.110 (enacted 2007) (criminalizing “promoting human trafficking”); LA. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 14:46.2 (2007) (criminalizing trafficking); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, 
§ 4701 (Supp. 2008) (enacted 2007) (defining and criminalizing human trafficking 
and creating a civil private right of action); MD. CODE ANN. CRIM. LAW § 11-303 (Lex-
isNexis Supp. 2008) (enacted 2007) (criminalizing trafficking); MICH. COMP. LAWS 
ANN. §§ 750.462b–.462i (West Supp. 2009) (enacted 2006) (criminalizing trafficking); 
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.281–.283 (West 2009) (enacted 2005) (criminalizing traffick-
ing); id. § 609.284 (enacted 2005) (creating civil liability for trafficking); id. 
§§ 609.321–.322 (amended 2005 to include sex trafficking) (including sex trafficking 
in a statute penalizing prostitution); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 97-3-54 to -54.4 (West Supp. 
2008) (enacted 2006) (criminalizing trafficking); MO. ANN. STAT. § 566.206 (West 
Supp. 2009) (enacted 2004) (criminalizing trafficking); id. § 566.209 (enacted 2004) 
(criminalizing sex trafficking); MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 566.212–.213 (West Supp. 2009) 
(enacted 2004) (criminalizing child sex trafficking); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-306 
(2007) (enacted 2007) (criminalizing trafficking); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-830 to -832 
(2008) (enacted 2006) (criminalizing trafficking); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 200.467–
.468 (LexisNexis Supp. 2007) (enacted 2007) (criminalizing trafficking); N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 633:6–:10 (2010) (enacted 2009) (criminalizing trafficking and estab-
lishing penalties); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:13-8 (West 2005 & Supp. 2009) (enacted 2005) 
(criminalizing trafficking); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-52-1 (LexisNexis 2009) (enacted 
2008) (criminalizing trafficking); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 135.35 (McKinney 2009) (enacted 
2007) (defining labor trafficking); id. § 230.34 (enacted 2007) (criminalizing sex traf-
ficking); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-43.10–.13 (2007) (enacted 2006) (defining and crimi-
nalizing labor and sex trafficking); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-40-01 to -02 (2010) 
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of the positive antitrafficking activism spurred at both the internation-
al and domestic level by the Palermo Protocol and the TVPA.  But the 
bills were also affected by the anti-immigrant climate in which many of 
them were passed.165  Consequently, the bills some state legislatures 
passed address trafficking only as part of a broader effort to insert 
state law enforcement and other regulators into the business of pu-
nishing migrants and regulating migration.166 
(enacted 2009) (defining and criminalizing trafficking); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, 
§ 748 (West Supp. 2009) (enacted 2008) (criminalizing trafficking); id. tit. 21, § 748.2 
(enacted 2008) (creating guidelines for human trafficking victims); OR. REV. STAT. 
§ 30.867 (2007) (enacted 2007) (creating a civil private right of action for trafficking 
victims); id. § 163.266 (enacted 2007) (criminalizing trafficking); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. 
§§ 3001–3004 (Supp. 2008) (enacted 2006) (criminalizing trafficking and authorizing 
restitution and forfeiture); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-67-1 to -5 (LexisNexis Supp. 2008) 
(enacted 2007) (criminalizing trafficking and authorizing restitution and forfeiture); 
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-930 (West Supp. 2008) (enacted 2006) (criminalizing traffick-
ing); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-13-307 to -311 (2009) (enacted 2008) (criminalizing traf-
ficking and providing restitution); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 98.001–.006 
(Vernon Supp. 2009) (enacted 2009) (creating civil remedies for trafficking); TEX. 
GOV’T CODE ANN. § 402.035 (Vernon Supp. 2009) (enacted 2009) (creating a human 
trafficking prevention task force); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 20A.01–.02 (Vernon 
Supp. 2009) (enacted 2003) (criminalizing trafficking); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-5-307 
to -310 (2008) (enacted 2008) (criminalizing trafficking); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 7.68.350 (West 2009) (enacted 2003) (creating a task force against human traffick-
ing); id. § 7.68.360 (enacted 2005) (mandating coordination of state agency proto-
cols); id. § 9A.40.100 (enacted 2003) (criminalizing trafficking); id. § 19.320.020 
(enacted 2009) (requiring disclosure to foreign laborers regarding working conditions 
and legal entitlements); id. § 19.320.030 (enacted 2009) (creating jurisdiction over in-
ternational recruitment agents); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.302 (West Supp. 2008) 
(enacted 2007) (criminalizing trafficking); id. § 948.051 (enacted 2007) (criminalizing 
child trafficking). 
165 See, e.g., George A. Martínez, Immigration:  Deportation and the Psuedo-Science of 
Unassimilable Peoples, 61 SMU L. REV. 7, 8  (2008) (detailing local efforts to enforce de-
portation on the basis of federal laws); Karla Mari McKanders, Welcome to Hazleton!  “Il-
legal” Immigrants Beware:  Local Immigration Ordinances and What the Federal Government 
Must Do About It, 39 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 3-4 (2007) (chronicling local ordinances that 
discriminate against immigrants); Olivas, supra note 145, at 32  (discussing “restriction-
ist” anti-immigration state statutes); Huyen Pham, Problems Facing the First Generation of 
Local Immigration Laws, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1303, 1303 (2008) (citing a Colorado law 
that required proof of immigration status before receiving benefits). 
166 See, e.g., Georgia Security and Immigration Compliance Act, 2006 GA. LAWS 105 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 13, 16, 35, 42, 43, 48 & 50 GA. CODE 
ANN.) (enacting antitrafficking laws as part of a very restrictive immigration bill); Jim 
Tharpe & Carlos Campos, Legislature 2006:  House Passes Bill on Illegals; Senate Prepares to 
Iron Out Differences, ATLANTA J. CONST., Mar. 24, 2006, at 1A (characterizing the bill as 
an effort by the Georgia legislature to “confront illegal immigration”); see also MO. 
ANN. STAT. § 577.675 (West Supp. 2009) (enacted 2008) (criminalizing the “traffick-
ing” of “any illegal alien who is not lawfully present,” suggesting that the law may func-
tion chiefly as an antismuggling provision in cases involving noncitizens).  In Maricopa 
County, Arizona, Sheriff Joe Arpaio, who has been engaged in a controversial law en-
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At the moment, there is very little evidence regarding how these 
laws will be deployed in the forty-eight states where they have been 
enacted.167  Some states, like California, seem interested in expanding 
their laws to help migrants by protecting victims regardless of citizen-
ship status and spotlighting exploitative labor practices.168  In other 
states, antitrafficking measures have passed in forms that suggest that 
officials’ true concern is to provide law enforcement with additional 
tools to curb unauthorized migration.  For the reasons discussed above, 
it is tremendously important to bring pressure to bear to ensure that 
state law enforcement agencies use their antitrafficking laws to curb ex-
ploitation rather than to promote the criminalization of immigration. 
CONCLUSION 
A vast number of the world’s citizens are displaced as a result of 
poverty, lack of opportunity, the ravages of armed conflict, or the 
dangers of political repression.  This population is particularly vulner-
able to exploitation by those who help them to cross international 
borders, as well as those in whose care or employment they find them-
selves upon arrival on the other side of the border. 
The legal tools states use to manage migration across state borders 
increase this marginalization.  Unless a person can establish her quali-
fications as a refugee or fit the narrow criteria for legal entrants, she 
undertakes border crossing in violation of the law and is then con-
fronted with the harsh penalties that states increasingly attach to viola-
tions of their border-control measures.  Traffickers know this.  They 
take advantage of the legal and social marginalization of migrants in 
order to profit from their exploitation.  This harm is different from 
the harms created by the smuggler; though he certainly profits from 
violations of state sovereignty, he also extracts a price from the mi-
grant that does not rise to the level of enslavement, indentured servi-
tude, forced prostitution, or debt bondage.  The line is not always 
forcement “crusade” against illegal immigration for the past few years, has posted signs 
on official vehicles that read, “Help Sheriff Joe Arpaio fight illegal immigration and 
trafficking.  Call 602.876.4154 with any info/tips on illegal aliens.”  Terry Carter, The 
Maricopa County Courthouse War, A.B.A. J., Apr. 2010, at 42, 46-47. 
167 See supra notes 92-93 (describing the relatively scant case law under state anti-
trafficking laws to date). 
168 On September 8, 2009, Governor Schwarzenegger signed into law a bill that 
requires law enforcement agents to identify trafficking victims diligently regardless of 
citizenship.  The bill also expands privacy protections for trafficking victims by allowing 
them to request that their names be kept out of the public records.  CAL. GOV’T CODE 
§ 6254 (West 2008); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 236.2, 293 (West Supp. 2009).    
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clear, but where exploitation permeates the relationship between the 
smuggler and the smuggled, or between the migrant and her employ-
er, the line is undoubtedly crossed. 
The TVPA provides one tool to address the needs of those who 
have been preyed upon by those who cross the line.  Overall, that tool 
has been useful.  Like the benefits of U.S. refugee and asylum law,169 it 
does not help all who technically qualify for assistance.  Only those 
victims of trafficking who are in the United States are able to avail 
themselves of the protections and benefits of the TVPA.  Moreover, 
for such individuals, this protection is only provided if the state deems 
their conditions to be sufficiently exploitative to rise to the level of 
“severe” forms of trafficking.  Even then, it is only granted if the per-
son complies with the demands of the legal system or presents a rea-
son for noncompliance.  In short, it is not a broadly available remedy. 
Individuals who come forward under the current system to claim 
protection as victims of trafficking face the real possibility that the 
government will not find them eligible for such protection.170  Yet, 
without protection, those individuals will be subject to deportation—
the clear prerogative of the state enforcing its immigration and other 
criminal laws.  The victim in the gray area faces a hard choice. 
There are at least two options to improve the plight of the migrant 
in the gray area.  The first is to expand the legal understanding of the 
kinds of coercive situations that constitute trafficking to encompass 
more of the exploitative situations that migrants face in an era of un-
precedented immigration enforcement.  The danger of this approach 
is that it is likely to prove unpopular with policymakers who seek to 
decrease incentives for illegal migration.  Such lawmakers have criti-
169 The President is authorized to set an annual cap for the admission of overseas 
refugees.  8 U.S.C. § 1157 (2006).  Although the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees estimates that, in 2008, there were 15.2 million refugees worldwide, only 
about 60,000 of those refugees were resettled in the United States that year.  UNITED 
NATIONS REFUGEE AGENCY, 2008 GLOBAL TRENDS:  REFUGEES, ASYLUM-SEEKERS, RE-
TURNEES, INTERNALLY DISPLACED AND STATELESS PEOPLE 2, 12 (2009), available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/4a375c426.html.  Political asylum is also available to refugees 
who are “physically present in the United States,” 8 U.S.C. § 1158, but this form of relief 
was granted only to about 22,000 more individuals in 2008.  DANIEL C. MARTIN & MI-
CHAEL HOEFER, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., REFUGEES AND ASYLEES:  2008, at 5 (2009), 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ois_rfa_fr_2008.pdf. 
170 For an overview of the number of T visa petitions denied over the past 5 years, 
see ATT’Y GEN. 2008 TRAFFICKING REPORT, supra note 22, at 35. 
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cized an expansive approach as a means of rewarding migrants who 
deliberately violate the law to cross borders.171 
The second option is to reexamine policies that do little to en-
hance border protection but increase the marginalization of all mi-
grants, including trafficking victims.  Eliminating the routine criminal 
prosecutions of illegal entrants along the southern border, working to 
identify, shame, and prosecute employers (and consumers) who profit 
from exploited labor forces, and applying National Labor Relations 
Act backpay remedies to all workers regardless of citizenship are all 
ways to improve the general status of migrants and increase protection 
for workers without creating perverse incentives to migrate unlawfully. 
The degree to which antitrafficking rhetoric can be used in ways 
that cut against these goals, rather than promote them, is troubling.  
By fueling the image of the migrant as a criminal, antitrafficking rhe-
toric compounds the myth of migrant criminality.  If migrants are 
perceived as dangerous criminals, the routine prosecutions of misde-
meanor illegal entry seem like a logical and desirable border-security 
measure.  A criminalized population is unlikely to garner sympathy 
when it is subject to exploitation in the workplace, thus rendering im-
possible the goals of collectively condemning unscrupulous employers 
and providing workplace remedies for the migrants abused by those 
employers.  Once the issue has been framed as a problem of migrant 
criminals, then the most obvious—and the most frequently pro-
moted—solution is to increase border controls and criminal enforce-
ment of immigration law. 
Antitrafficking policies have to start not with border control but 
with an effort to eliminate the marginalization that generates exploita-
tion.172  For this to happen, the discourse around trafficking needs to 
change.  Enforcement officers at the highest levels need to pay more 
attention to how the problem of trafficking is characterized and how 
agents are trained to solve it.  Advocates of antitrafficking measures 
need to be careful about how they characterize the problem of traf-
171 See Chacón, supra note 10, at 3022 (discussing TVPA’s limited definition of traf-
ficking in light of protecting victims who “consented” to some aspect of their transpor-
tation across borders). 
172 The relatively narrow recommendations set forth in this Article do not consti-
tute a call for open borders, although some scholars have urged that this is the best 
way to eradicate not only trafficking but a whole host of other social ills.  See, e.g., 
JOHNSON, supra note 138; cf. Bravo, Free Labor!, supra note 1, at 616 (urging a libera-
lized labor regime, which is a more modest version of the open-borders proposal); Gal-
lagher, supra note 1, at 833-34 (arguing that trafficking is an inevitable byproduct of 
closed borders, but conceding that borders will be closed for the foreseeable future). 
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ficking when they push for antitrafficking measures at the state and 
local levels or propose reforms at the national and international le-
vels.  Inaccurate assumptions about migrant criminality and border 
security plague antitrafficking discussions.  Rooting those assumptions 
out of the discourse is a starting point for moving the national (and 
international) conversation in a direction that will allow for the crea-
tion of antitrafficking strategies that do not have the perverse effect of 
fueling the marginalization that lies at the heart of trafficking. 
 
